The Purpose of Surveillance

While surveillance has been a recurring topic on this blog, the technological environment has developed significantly over the past twenty years.

Once upon a time, the only form of real-time surveillance involved so-called closed circuit systems (CCTV), providing a dedicated watcher with a view of what was going on at that moment, although these systems now generally include a recording function, often operate retrospectively, and feed into an open-ended ecosystem of discipline-and-punish. As I noted in May 2008, the purpose of CCTV had extended from monitoring to include deterrence and penalty, and in the process it had ceased to be closed circuit in the original sense.

Fiction has provided some alternative models of surveillance and control. As well as Fritz Lang's 1960 film The Thousand Eyes of Dr Mabuse, there are the Palantíri in Tolkein's Lord of the Rings, which are indestructable stones or crystal balls enabling events to be seen from afar.

The data company Palantir. whose founders included Alex Karp and Peter Thiel, was originally established to provide big data analytics to the intelligence community. Geoff Shullenberger suggests that Palantir might be understood as an application of the ideas of Leo Strauss (who inspired Thiel): an enterprise that acknowledges the deep, dangerous undercurrent of human violence and harnesses the reams of data generated by the internet to monitor and control it. Meanwhile Moira Weigel notes the contribution of Adorno (who inspired Karp): Adorno’s jargon anticipates the software tools Palantir would develop. By tracing the rhetorical patterns that constitute jargon in literary language, Karp argues that he can reveal otherwise hidden identities and affinities—and the drive to commit violence that lies latent in them.

 

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Geoff Shullenberger, The Intellectual Origins of Surveillance Tech (Outsider Theory, 17 July 2020)

Moira Weigel, Palantir goes to the Frankfurt School (Boundary2, 10 July 2020)

Related posts: Surveillance and its Effects (May 2005), What's in a Name - CCTV (May 2008), As Shepherds Watched (April 2024)

Surveillance@DemandingChange, Surveillance@POSIWID

What's in a name? CCTV

Scribe has just sent me a link to a story from The Register called School crossing guards join CCTV panlollycon [30 April 2008].

I share Scribe's unease at the proliferation of cameras for various often ill-considered purposes. But a few weeks ago, I was with my son, using the zebra crossing outside his primary school with the aid of a lollipop lady. A driver ignored all of us and drove past, in clear breach of safety and the Highway Code. If I had been quick enough to get out my mobile phone and snap his number plate, I probably would have done. What me, inconsistent?

Meanwhile I wonder about the increasing use of the term CCTV to refer to systems that are not closed-circuit, but feed into an open-ended ecosystem of discipline-and-punish. The purpose of CCTV has extended from monitoring to include deterrence and penalty, and in the process it has ceased to be "closed circuit".

What I find particularly interesting here is that it illustrates the way technologies can so easily (and almost invisibly) start to be used "off-label" - in other words, breaking out of their initial context and purpose, without people even noticing that this has occurred. This isn't just semantics; if we pay attention to language, we can sometimes spot real shifts in the way certain effects are produced.

DNA and Crime 2

In a police state, anything that makes the police more effective is a Good Thing.

We are being bombarded with various measures (actual and proposed) that apparently make the police more effective. Longer detention-without-trial for terrorist suspects. CCTV evidence. And a national DNA database.

Proponents of these measures never fail to slip positive messages into the news media.

On the one hand, here's a terrible crime that was fortuitously solved many years later, *thanks to* the brilliant intervention of DNA scientists. On the other hand, here are some terrible crimes that may never be cleared up, *because* the relevant DNA wasn't recorded.

On the one hand, here is a wicked terrorist whom we were forced to release after a mere 28 days, although we *knew* he was plotting something terrible. On the other hand, here is another wicked terrorist, whom we were able to prosecute *because* the evidence just happened to emerge after a mere 45 days of investigation.

Opponents of these measures sometimes argue that they are ineffective or inaccurate. It is implausible to believe that evidence will suddenly appear after 28 days that was not available before. They say they will only agree to this measure if it can be shown that it sometimes works.

Other opponents argue that they are disproportionate. They do not deny that they may possibly work in a few cases, but claim that the benefits are grossly outweighed by the illiberal side-effects.

The problem with both of these lines of argument is that they are vulnerable to constructed refutation. Detection can be attributed to DNA for crimes that might possibly have been solved by other means. Suspected terrorists can be detained for the maximum permitted period, not just because the investigators are under less pressure to find evidence more quickly, but also because the investigators need to demonstrate that the currently permitted maximum is barely enough. Under certain conditions, the statistics could start to look very favourable, enough to overcome the "disproportionate" argument.

And the supporters of these measures have a further argument up their sleeve - the hypothetical deterrent effect. Imagine how many more crimes might have been perpetrated: would-be criminals who saw the cameras, or remembered the DNA held hostage in the police database, and decided to stay home and watch Big Brother instead. Imagine how many more people might have attempted to smuggle dangerous chemicals or stiletto heels onto aeroplanes, if it had not been for the constant vigilance of dedicated security screeners.

My point is this. Opponents of some specific measure may declare that the measure is unacceptable or counter-productive in a civilized society, may declare that the measure could only be accepted if such-and-such facts could be produced. And they may believe that this opposition is fairly solid, because these facts are extremely unlikely.

But what if the advocates of these measures are able to influence the facts? ...

Of course, I am not saying we are in a police state today. I am not even saying that specific measures would turn our country into a police state. All I am saying is that it is possible to see how repeated application of certain lines of argument could result in a police state.

Update

Here's some evidence to support my conjecture:

• "Up against the buffers": Fact and fiction about the existing 28 day pre-charge detention limit (Liberty, 10 June 2008)
• BBC News 10 June 2008 quoting Liberty Director Shami Chakrabarti

Security Theatre

Steve Swain, formerly with the Metropolitan Police and now a consultant with Control Risks, questions the belief that security cameras prevent crime or terrorism.

"I don't know of a single incident where CCTV has actually been used to spot, apprehend or detain offenders in the act. ... The presence of CCTV is irrelevant for those who want to sacrifice their lives to carry out a terrorist act." [CNN August 3rd, 2007, via Bruce Schneier]

Swain has also written an article in the latest issue of his company's newsletter challenging the fantasy of technology.

"In today's threat environment, technology for law enforcement agencies is seen as the answer to all our prayers; all seeing, infallible, indefatigable. If only." [Perspective, July 2007, pdf]

Meanwhile, the City of New York is planning to spend $90m million (annual running costs $8 million) on a network of security cameras, code-named "Ring of Steel". New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly seems unconcerned that there is no positive evidence of any deterrent effect.

"We don't know acts that may have been planned that -- because of the surveillance and deterrence systems that are in place -- did not go forward." [CNN August 3rd, 2007]

Seems a remarkably thin justification for spending public money. So if security cameras don't actually prevent crime and terrorism, what is their real purpose? Swain suggests two answers: investigation and public reassurance.

"You need to do this piece of theater so that if the terrorists are looking at you, they can see that you've got some measures in place."

Oh, right. Chief Wiggum rules okay.

Wikipedia: Clancy Wiggum
See also: The ineffectiveness of security cameras

Surveillance 2

On his way home from Salford University, Robin Wilton has the good fortune to pass Strangeways Prison, and is prompted to blog about the panopticon.

POSIWID teaches us to look at the effects of a system rather than its avowed purpose. I have just re-read a post by Scribe (The two faces of CCTV) [URL updated] in which he discusses and dismisses several avowed (and contradictory) purposes of CCTV. Among other things, surveillance is supposed to teach good behaviour to those being watched. In reality, surveillance often merely teaches more devious or secretive behaviour.

Most of the discussion of panopticon revolves around the people under surveillance. But we should also consider the corrupting effect of panopticon on those doing the watching. See my previous posts Guarding the Guardians and Surveillance and its Effects.

In March/April 2005, there was a lengthy debate between Stefan Brandt (from Credentica and McGill) and SuperPat (Pat Patterson of Sun Microsystems) as to whether the Liberty Alliance counted as panoptical. There is a useful index to the debate by Kim Cameron (Microsoft). But this debate revolved largely around the technical features of the Liberty Alliance architecture, and on the hierarchical/network trust relationships. I don't deny that these details are important and interesting, but I don't think they have anything to do with the panopticon.

The panopticon was designed to produce certain effects - certain changes in behaviour in the actors. In my view, this is what is most important in deciding whether to regard something as a metaphorical implementation of the panopticon. I haven't seen any contribution to the Liberty/panopticon debate that identified any such effects.

Surveillance and its Effects

Surveillance is a process of keeping people (such as customers and employees, as well as members of the public) under close supervision. What are the effects of surveillance? Here are two answers from an interesting blog (now called Into The Machine) whose main purpose seems to be to critique the authoritarian policies of the UK Home Secretary (past and present).

• All CCTV monitoring does is lock down the public face of our nation, allowing us in our public capacity to simply sweep aside all the factors that lead to the crime and attitude we're experiencing every day. (The Two Faces of CCTV)
• Surveillance will always produce nothing but underground revelry and a false sense of security. (The Ubiquity of Unnatural Surveillance)

[update: blog title and URLs changed, content looks the same]

It is clearly important to understand the effects on those being observed. But it is also interesting to note the effects on those doing (or relying upon) the observing.

Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon was originally a prison so designed that the warder could watch all the prisoners at the same time. By extension, this term is used to describe any technical or institutional arrangement to watch/ monitor large numbers of people. It forms part of Foucault's analysis of discipline, and provides a useful metaphor for various modern technologies

• CCTV
• workforce monitoring
• database systems such as customer relationship management (CRM)
• Google

The panopticon provides surveillance, and may result in a loss of privacy for the people being watched / monitored, but may also make people feel they are being looked after (better quality of service, safer). If you know you’re being watched, this may trigger various feelings – both positive and negative.

Besides the impact on the people being watched, the pantopticon often has an adverse effect on the watcher. The panopticon gives the illusion of transparency and completeness – so the watcher comes to believe three fallacies

• that everything visible is undistorted truth
• that everything visible is important
• that everything important is visible

This is one of the reasons why surveillance mechanisms often become dysfunctional even for those doing the surveillance. For example, instead of customer relationship management (CRM) promoting better relationships with the customer, it becomes a bureaucratic obsession with the content of the customer database.

See also Surveillance 2 (September 2005)