Spelling Crimez

According to news reports, a ten-year-old child recently got a visit from the police after writing that he lived in a 'terrorist' house. 

Given that the family was Muslim, the Internet jumps to the conclusion that there was some racial stereotyping going on here. A day or so earlier, the Prime Minister had announced a fund (or at least partially reversed previous cuts to such funding) to teach Muslim women to speak English (which would presumably include learning the correct spelling of such words as 'terraced').

If the police were serious about gathering intelligence about potential extremists in the community, and if they believed that this was a genuine lead to an extremist family, you'd have thought they would want to treat the boy as a valuable source of information, rather than immediately alerting the family that they were under suspicion. What purpose does a home visit achieve, apart from shock and awe.

The authorities have responded to the news reports, claiming that the home visit was not prompted solely by a single misspelling, there were a number of issues arising from the child's schoolwork, and that it had not been regarded as a terror incident. The home visit had been done by a social worker, accompanied by a PC.

According to the boy's cousin, the boy is now scared of writing, or using his imagination. Arguably that's not a good use of police time, when a bit of well-timed sarcasm by a schoolteacher can achieve that outcome much more efficiently.


Update. Apparently what the boy actually wrote was this.

"I hate it when my uncle beats me. I live in a terrorist house with my uncle."

So what happened within the family after the social worker (accompanied by the PC) leaves? And what happened within the community when the media sensationalized the story? Can anyone use some imagination?

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Rahila Bano, Muslim boy, 10, probed for 'terrorist house' spelling error (BBC News 20 January 2016)

Mario Cacciottolo, How much of a problem is speaking English for some Muslim women? (BBC News 18 January 2016)

Aisha Gani, Lancashire police criticise BBC over 'terrorist house' story (BBC News, 21 January 2016)

Lancashire 'terrorist house' row 'not a spelling mistake' (BBC News 20 January 2016)

Bill Jacobs, 'We've done nothing wrong' - Teachers and police respond to 'terrorist house' 'overreaction' (Lancashire Telegraph, 21 January 2016)


Updated 21 January 2016

Delight in Giddiness

@roygrubb praises @HPluckrose for clarity.

We need you to define 'Islamophobia' very clearly by 7th May @Ed_Miliband. Will such statements be criminalised? pic.twitter.com/moStkDYcD7
— Helen Pluckrose (@HPluckrose) April 25, 2015

Perfect. Couldn't be stated more clearly. https://t.co/YI2reCO7Ed
— Roy Grubb (@roygrubb) April 26, 2015

Helen says we need something. But is this really a clear statement of requirements? What exactly is she demanding here? Does she expect politicians to provide precise definitions of all the cliches and platitudes and vague promises in the manifesto or on the hustings? If benefits are going to be directed towards "hard-working families", do we need this term to be defined as well? (See Terry Eagleton's criticism of the party manifestos.)

Supposing it to be possible to legislate about "islamophobia" (or "hate crime"), the term would need to be defined properly, so that the legislation is fair and workable. My initial reading of Helen's tweet was that she believed that a meaningful definition was not possible, therefore legislation would not be possible, therefore the promise to legislate would be either foolish or in bad faith. However, instead of stating this belief directly, she expresses her challenge in the form of a case that may demonstrate the impossibility of producing a fair and workable definition.

Of course, this form of challenge is quite legitimate, but I should like to quibble with Roy's assertion that it is the clearest (most explicit) way of posing such a challenge. The fact that I initially misread Helen's tweet (as affirmed in the comment below this post) reinforces my concern about clarity. I'm not blaming Helen for this - it is rarely possible to express one's complete meaning in a 140 character tweet.  

Helen wants Ed Miliband to reassure us that any legislation would be drawn narrowly, to avoid restricting legitimate intellectual debate. However, there is a precedent for ill-defined and over-generalized terms being coded into legislation, as shown in the absurd laws on "glorifying terrorism", and we may have little confidence that the legislators will apply the appropriate rigour in coming up with a proper definition of anything.

The example quoted by Helen is interesting because it could be used to generate further examples. Firstly, the word "Islam" could be replaced with the word "Christianity". Secondly, the word "Islam" could be replaced with the phrase "Islam-or-Christianity". Could someone who wished to attack Islam and/or its adherents evade the Islamophobia laws by including a token attack on other religions and their adherents? And how would the law regard someone who claims to attack all religions indiscriminately but is accused of devoting a disproportionate amount of his bile for one religion in particular?

The example quoted by Helen is also interesting because it attacks the notion of truth embedded in the phrase "True Islam", using a correspondence notion of truth, which Richard Dawkins and other scientists take as the epistemological "gold standard". But I think many people would interpret "True Islam" in terms of some (subjective) notion of authenticity, and regard the opening statement as either begging the question or deliberate provocation.


What is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Certainly there be, that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affecting free-will in thinking, as well as in acting.

---

Hamed Chapman, Labour would outlaw Islamophobia, says Miliband in an exclusive interview (Muslim News, 24 April 2015)
S. Abbas Raza, Richard Dawkins, Relativism and Truth (3Quarks Daily, December 2005)
Francis Bacon, Of Truth (Essays)
Terry Eagleton, Which party’s election manifesto is the best written? (Guardian 24 April 2015)

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Correspondence Theory of Truth
Wikipedia: Terrorism Act 2006. 
POSIWID blog: Glory Glory Knockdown Argument (October 2005)


Update 14:20 UK time following Helen's comment. Clarified that this was my initial (but incorrect) reading of her tweet. Reworded from "attack Islam" to "attack Islam and/or its adherents".

Signalling Terrorism

From the @NewYorker, Steve Coll on how the U.S. talks about terrorists - this is a brief review of “U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy and al-Qaeda: Signaling and the Terrorist World-View,” by Joshua Alexander Geltzer.

According to Geltzer, Cheney believed that Al Qaeda attacks had been encouraged by "provocative weakness" - ambiguous signals from previous administrations, not just Clinton, but going back to Reagan - and was determined to send tough signals to Al Qaeda.

But in Geltzer's opinion, the audience that would be most responsive to these signals would be an audience of people who thought like Cheney himself. "The audience that appears to have been in the minds of American policymakers as they crafted their counter-terrorist signals was one akin to America as audience."

Steve Coll comments that "as a rhetorical tour de force ... this is a little too neat to be completely convincing". However, "as a breath-catching take on the problem of unexamined, ineffective, domestic-driven American signaling to terrorists, whether of the nascent Obama or entrenched Cheney type, Geltzer’s work is very impressive".

Tough Decisions

Many people have been quick to criticize the Scottish decision to liberate Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi, the Libyan convicted of the Lockerbie bombing.

The general tone of the criticism is shocked, puzzled or angry. Before the decision was announced, Hillary Clinton described the possibility of al-Megrahi's release as "absolutely wrong" [BBC News 19 August 2009]. Following the announcement, Barack Obama has denounced the release as a mistake [Guardian 21 August 2009], the head of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation has launched a scathing attack on the Scottish government [BBC News 22 August 2009], and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm Mike Mullen said: "This is obviously a political decision" [BBC News 23 August 2009]. As if these powerful and (presumably) well-informed people considered the decision to be quite straightforward. Or perhaps they are simply aggrieved that their own wishes haven't prevailed.

Two main lines of conspiracy theory are emerging. One line is that the release is in return for arms sales or some other secret deal. (So that's why the US government are complaining?) The other line is that the authorities have privately conceded that the conviction was unsound (as the UN observer believed at the time, and as Paul Foot documented in great detail in a 2001 Private Eye special report) and now wish to release al-Megrahi before an appeal against the conviction can be heard (as a CIA spook now suggests).

• Hans Köchler: I saw the trial – and the verdict made no sense (Independent 21 August 2009)
• Libyan Takeaway (Private Eye #1243 21 August 2009)
  
• CIA spook says Megrahi was freed before appeal humiliated justice system (Sunday Mail 23 August 2009)
• Malise Ruthven, Deception Over Lockerbie? (New York Review of Books, Volume 56, Number 15, 8th October 2009)

Perhaps it's inevitable that people are going to be angry about the decision if they don't know all the facts. And it's easy to criticize from your armchair, if you aren't the one making the tough decisions. As always, my recommendation is to think of a frame in which the decision appears to make sense. Compassion or conspiracy - you choose.

---

May 2012. Following his death, several papers carry such headlines as "Megrahi takes truth to the grave". This would only be correct if we were to assume Mr al-Megrahi had ever known the truth.

Keelan Balderson, Lockerbie Bomber Was Innocent; New Documents Support the Obvious (29 Feb 2012)

Robert Fisk, Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi is dead. Now we'll never know the truth about Lockerbie (The Independent, 21 May 2012)

Francis Kumadoh, When will the truth be told? (21 May 2012)

LockerbieTruth.com

From Malcolm X to Barack Obama

Many of us expected some kind of statement or action by Al Qaeda after the election of Barack Obama. But I don't know whether anyone expected anything quite like the statement that appeared yesterday [Al-Qaeda vows to hurt Obama's US, BBC News 19 November 2008].

Malcolm X contrasted "field negroes" who hated their white masters with "house negroes" who, he said, were loyal to them [Message to the grassroots]. Referring explicitly to this speech, Ayman al-Zawahri described President-elect Obama as a "house negro". (Mr al-Zawahri actually used the arabic expression "abeed al-beit, which means "house slave", but this was rendered as "house negro" in the message's English subtitles.) What possible effect is this message supposed to have, in America or in the rest of the world? Or has AlQaeda lost the plot?

• Al-Qaeda plays the race card against Barack Obama … no, seriously (TrainWreckPolitics)
• Al-Qaeda's most epic fail ever (The American Prospect)
  

What effects is it likely to have? Firstly, it has prompted several bloggers to refer sarcastically to the crazy rightwing myth that Obama is actually Malcolm X's love-child. Sounds like Star Wars to me - Obama as a Jedi knight, overcoming the black ideology of his symbolic father. I guess AlQaeda would read the symbolism the other way around - Amerika as Sith. In any case, AlQaeda and the American Right are both attached to the kind of simplistic mythological worldview promoted in films like Star Wars, and perhaps Mr al-Zawahri will be happy to see anything that reinforces this worldview.

The second potential effect is reflexive. People often inadvertently reveal their own weaknesses and shame when criticizing others. Perhaps this is because they focus on those characteristics they are most uncomfortable or ashamed about in themselves. As a result of contrasting President-elect Obama with "honourable Black Americans", Mr al-Zawahri is inevitably going to find himself and his terrorist pals contrasted with "honourable Arab Moslems". And perhaps at some level he thinks this too.

Terrorism and Innovation

What is the purpose of security theatre at airports? To catch stupid terrorists? TSA boss Kip Hawley claims that this would be better than nothing.

"Clever terrorists can use innovative ways to exploit vulnerabilities. But don’t forget that most bombers are not, in fact, clever. Living bomb-makers are usually clever, but the person agreeing to carry it may not be super smart. Even if “all” we do is stop dumb terrorists, we are reducing risk." [TSA blog 21 October 2008]

In a reply to Bruce Schneier, Hawley adds

"Thanks for not taking a shot at me on my risk management point that even if we are just stopping dumb terrorists, we are reducing risk. You didn’t go for a clever rhetorical gimme, but instead raised the good point about transferring risk to outside the airport environment. That is a worthy discussion for another time." [Schneier on Security 28 October 2008]

Okay, here is a clever rhetorical gimme: the Atlantic has launched a New Contest: Can You Out-Lame the TSA?

Meanwhile the clever terrorists innovate.

"Intelligence shows that terrorists innovate in explosives formulas as well as the way they would bring them onboard an aircraft. That won’t change any time soon. If liquid restrictions are eased eventually it will be because of improved process and technology, not diminished threat." [TSA Blog 24 October 2008]

In other words, the effect of security theatre (Hawley doesn't admit that it is theatre of course, but then we wouldn't expect him to) is to force terrorism to evolve - to develop not only more clever terrorists but also less detectable tactics. Which in turn forces the TSA to acquire more and more expensive technology. The TSA blog is called The Evolution of Security.

But what about the Insecurity of Evolution? If the TSA were only facing a short-term threat there would be no reason to worry about the evolution of the threat over time, but that's obviously not the case. The requirements facing the TSA keep changing, and the TSA response is just to add more things to an already cumbersome and costly system. Things that were implemented incrementally in a series of panic responses to various incidents are now a permanent feature of our air travel experience (except for those wealthy enough to fly on private jets) - first shoes, then liquids, who knows (apart from the clever terrorists) what further troubles will be added in future?

At some point in the curve, air travel simply becomes non-viable. Bruce Schneier points out that the terrorists could easily switch to other targets. But more importantly, I hope travellers will switch to other modes of transport. At present, the only conceivable reason I can think of for flying from London to Paris is because the train is too expensive. But if air travellers were forced to pay the true cost of the security theatre, instead of its being funded by the tax-payer, then trains would start to look a lot more attractive.

---

See also Jeffrey Goldberg, The Things He Carried (Atlantic, November 2008) via Bruce Schneier

Hedgehog Politics

According to Archilochus (via Isaiah Berlin), the fox knows lots of little things, and the hedgehog only knows one thing.

For the political hedgehog, nearly any problem can be linked to terrorism

• Heckling at party conferences
  
• Icelandic bankruptcy
  
• Strange advertising
  
• Tourists taking photos
  

And the solution to nearly every problem seems to be some kind of central database

• Children
• Communications
• Interception Modernization
  
• DNA

Is that what they call asymmetric information warfare?

The Power of Nightmares 3

When Osama Bin Laden intervened in the US election four years ago, I thought it was pretty obvious he knew this would benefit Bush. See my post The Power of Nightmares (October 2004).

Turns out I wasn't alone in thinking Bin Laden wanted Bush to win. Apparently the CIA took the same view. Rany Jazayerli now asks Will Bin Laden Strike Again?

We don't even have to speculate whether Bin Laden is still alive, because the effect would be pretty much the same even if it was only his associates putting out a suitable message in his name. It's the brand image that counts.

Rany makes no claims to comprehend the mind of a terrorist, and I don't either. However, I don't imagine they'd just repeat what they did last time. Doesn't terrorism have to have an element of surprise?

And doesn't terrorism also have to have some purpose? If Bin Laden follows the American opinion polls, he may conclude that the election is beyond influence; so he might prefer to wait until after the election and then send a message to the new president. Terrorists have certainly done this kind of thing before. In July 2007 Gordon Brown was faced with a terrorist incident two days after becoming Prime Minister. As I said at the time (Timing and Regime Change), the underlying message seemed to be that, in the eyes of the terrorists, nothing had changed. If the terrorists are really trying to provoke America into further war, they may have a marginal preference for the Republicans, simply because in recent years the Republicans have proved easier to provoke, but that surely isn't going to stop them trying to provoke a Democrat administration as well.

Meanwhile, if a mysterious video does appear just before election day, it may be hard to avoid the suspicion that this is a carefully designed fake. Cui Bono?

Purpose of Counter-Terrorism 2

Commonly described as heir to various great American and European writers (Joyce, Pynchon, DeLillo), and compared with writers from Gerald Manley Hopkins to Dostoevsky, David Foster Wallace died earlier this month, apparently at his own hand. By chance, I had just bought a book of his essays, and I was looking forward to reading his review of Tracy Austin's "autobiography", and his report on McCain's 2000 campaign. [See my post US Election 2008: Sincerity versus Authenticity]

Last year Wallace wrote a short polemic in the Atlantic about terrorism and counter-terrorism, called Just Asking, in which he suggested the following thought-experiment: that instead of reducing American liberty for the sake of security against terrorism, America could decide to keep its liberties and accept a certain level of terrorism. The victims of these acts would be democratic martyrs, sacrificial witnesses to the eternal values of American liberty.

Is this a monstrous idea, he asks? Then why do we not also regard it as monstrous to sacrifice 40,000 Americans every year to the liberties of the motor car?

Two hundred years ago, Benjamin Franklin warned of the false trade-off between safety and liberty. Now it seems to be impossible to have a serious political debate about this, either in America or in Europe. We apparently have no choice - the decisions are made on our behalf by elected politicians - or worse, by stupid functionaries.

And Wallace ends with two rhetorical questions: "Have we actually become so selfish and scared that we don’t even want to consider whether some things trump safety? What kind of future does that augur?"

Purpose of Counter-Terrorism

Cost-benefit analysis of counter-terrorism, based on some notional estimate of lives saved, is problematic for three reasons.

Firstly, any estimate of lives saved is completely arbitrary. There doesn't seem to be any reliable method for predicting the number of lives lost to terrorism under any given starting conditions.

Secondly, even with implausibly large estimates, the numbers simply don't add up. The amounts spent on frustrating the intentions of terrorists are far greater (per notional life saved) than the amounts spent on other live-saving measures. (Thousands of people die in road accidents every year, and we don't see governments spending similar amounts on road safety.)

Thirdly, most of the money spent on counter-terrorism protects specific targets against specific tactics. So if the terrorists are smart enough to switch tactics or find alternative targets, the investment in counter-terrorism is largely wasted.

In order to justify spending more (proportionately) on counter-terrorism than on road safety or public health, you have to argue that there is a qualitative difference between terrorism and other causes of death.

Note also that the cost of counter-terrorism is not just borne by governments and other organizations (buying scanning equipment for airports, employing people to operate the equipment) but also by ordinary people. Bruce Schneier points out that 760 million US passengers wasting 30 minutes per trip in security checks amounts to 43,000 person-years, equivalent to 620 lives wasted annually. (But we shouldn't take this too seriously, he avers. "This kind of thing is why most ROI models you get from security vendors are nonsense".) (Click here for more of Bruce's posts on cost-benefit analysis and security.)

Cost-benefit analysis may be a good idea (presumably better than scattering money at random) but is clearly not the whole story.

Some say that the purpose of terrorism is not (just) to kill people, but to disrupt the political process. In which case the purpose of counter-terrorism is not (just) to protect lives but to protect the political process. So that must be what the politicians are spending our money on.

After Hurricane Katrina, Richard Posner of the Chicago Law School suggested that the rebuilding (or not) of New Orleans should consider the potential vulnerability of the rebuilt city to specific terrorist attacks. Now this kind of argument is interesting for two reasons.

Firstly, it greatly extends the scope of the cost-benefit analysis - we might find ourselves spending much more on the rebuilding, or rebuilding elsewhere, purely to avoid the terrorism risk.

Secondly because it suggests that major political decisions (rebuilding New Orleans) are influenced by the possibility of terrorism. To what extent does this represent a rational response to a real threat, and to what extent does it imply a society driven by fear? Shall we completely abandon large cities and mass transportation? Shall we organize ourselves into small communities, not worth attacking? Have we therefore failed after all to protect the political process from terrorism?

Fantastic Plots

Bruce Schneier takes issue with the Washington Post report of a terrorist plot.

"Batiste confided, somewhat fantastically, that he wanted to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, which would then fall into a nearby prison, freeing Muslim prisoners who would become the core of his Moorish army. With them, he would establish his own country."

Most of the people who read Bruce's blog are engineers. So they think the most difficult part of the plan is dropping the Tower into the prison. Forming an army and establishing a country - those parts of the plan can't be very difficult can they?

Meanwhile, Bruce objects to the qualifier "somewhat".

"What would the Washington Post consider to be truly fantastic? A plan involving Godzilla? Clearly they have some very high standards."

But for the sake of making a point, Bruce pretends not to understand the difference between an adjective and an adverb. It is not the plot itself that the Post is describing as fantastical, but Batiste's dramatic way of confiding it. (I am working on a film script in which Batiste would be played by Johnny Depp or Russell Brand.)

And to whom was Batiste confiding? To an undercover FBI agent pretending to be a terrorist, and with money to invest in the right plot. In the belief that he was bidding for Al-Qaeda money, and with little regard for technical feasibility, Batiste invented a crazy plot. He was then "refocused" by the undercover agent, and directed towards a plot that the FBI thought would be more likely to stand up in court. So how dangerous is Batiste really?

On the Washington Post's account, it looks as if the plot emerged as a result of the active intervention and incitement of the FBI. So whose fantasy is it?

Reference to a Moorish army in the Post story indicates another element of fantasy. Batiste was associated with the Moorish Science Temple of America. If the FBI equates this organization with Wahhabi Islam, this indicates a certain degree of syncretism on the part of the FBI. Or perhaps sheer ignorance.

So what exactly is the purpose of the FBI? To incite people to produce fantastic plots? To lump disparate groups together into a single homogeneous mass of potential terrorists? Is this the best that the FBI can come up with?

Travel Hopefully

The quaint licensing laws of the United Kingdom used to contain the notion of the "bona fide traveller". At certain times and places (Sundays? Scotland and Wales?) inns were not permitted to serve alcohol to local customers, but could only serve genuine tourists, people who travelled "in good faith".

In some parts of the country, people would go on Sunday coach trips to the next town, where they could drink as travellers. This was certainly against the spirit and letter of the law - they were travelling in order to drink, not travelling "in good faith" - but they usually got away with it.

I remember hearing the great war correspondent James Cameron tell a stirring tale of having battled his way back to Scotland across several continents, perhaps from some remote corner of the Korean or Vietnam War, only to be denied a drink in the pub nearest his home because as a local he didn't count as a "bona fide traveller".

Today, in the photogenic but dysfunctional Terminal Five building at Heathrow Airport, the airport authority hoped to verify travellers' bona fides by taking fingerprints. Are you permitted to buy cheap gin? Are you permitted to get on this charabanc to Rhyl, with or without baggage?

Biometrics and identity cards can maybe tell the authorities who you are and where you live, but they are not enough to reveal your intentions, your bona fides. Did you pack this bag yourself? Has a mysterious stranger given you anything to carry? Are you conspiring to overthrow, put down, or to destroy any government by force? (tick YES or NO)

BAA claims that fingerprints are required to prevent terrorists from stealing into the UK, but of course what they really mean is "known" terrorists - people whose names and fingerprints are already on the blacklist, or people who are already "wanted" in other countries. Maybe we need some more technology - perhaps lie detectors, or the "tunnel of truth".

Meanwhile, there are suspicions in some quarters that the physical layout and passenger processing are principally designed not to promote the security of the country and its transport operations, but to promote the commercial profitability of the airport and its retail operations. Fingerprints overruled by the Information Commissioner, they are going to take photographs instead. Oh well, so that's all right then. Rhyl, here I come.

See also: Heathrow Terminal Five, Actually You Can't Fly Either

Doubt or Certainty

Adam Shostack challenges The Frequency of Fake bin Laden Messages:

"I've noticed that every time there's a new message from Osama bin Laden, the press very carefully calls into question its authenticity."

Adam suggests that this doubt emanates from the intelligence community, possibly with the intention of undermining the strength of these messages. Adam asks why the media play along.

But this shows the power of groupthink among journalists. If other journalists regard something as true and certain, then you look very feeble if you frame your statements with "alleged" or "purported". But if other journalists are being cautious, it is pretty foolhardy to claim superior knowledge. Excuse me Mr Clever Journalist, do you have special sources of information or something? Perhaps you'd like to come and help us with our enquiries? Or are you just one of these amateurs that shoots your mouth off without any evidence?

DNA and Crime 2

In a police state, anything that makes the police more effective is a Good Thing.

We are being bombarded with various measures (actual and proposed) that apparently make the police more effective. Longer detention-without-trial for terrorist suspects. CCTV evidence. And a national DNA database.

Proponents of these measures never fail to slip positive messages into the news media.

On the one hand, here's a terrible crime that was fortuitously solved many years later, *thanks to* the brilliant intervention of DNA scientists. On the other hand, here are some terrible crimes that may never be cleared up, *because* the relevant DNA wasn't recorded.

On the one hand, here is a wicked terrorist whom we were forced to release after a mere 28 days, although we *knew* he was plotting something terrible. On the other hand, here is another wicked terrorist, whom we were able to prosecute *because* the evidence just happened to emerge after a mere 45 days of investigation.

Opponents of these measures sometimes argue that they are ineffective or inaccurate. It is implausible to believe that evidence will suddenly appear after 28 days that was not available before. They say they will only agree to this measure if it can be shown that it sometimes works.

Other opponents argue that they are disproportionate. They do not deny that they may possibly work in a few cases, but claim that the benefits are grossly outweighed by the illiberal side-effects.

The problem with both of these lines of argument is that they are vulnerable to constructed refutation. Detection can be attributed to DNA for crimes that might possibly have been solved by other means. Suspected terrorists can be detained for the maximum permitted period, not just because the investigators are under less pressure to find evidence more quickly, but also because the investigators need to demonstrate that the currently permitted maximum is barely enough. Under certain conditions, the statistics could start to look very favourable, enough to overcome the "disproportionate" argument.

And the supporters of these measures have a further argument up their sleeve - the hypothetical deterrent effect. Imagine how many more crimes might have been perpetrated: would-be criminals who saw the cameras, or remembered the DNA held hostage in the police database, and decided to stay home and watch Big Brother instead. Imagine how many more people might have attempted to smuggle dangerous chemicals or stiletto heels onto aeroplanes, if it had not been for the constant vigilance of dedicated security screeners.

My point is this. Opponents of some specific measure may declare that the measure is unacceptable or counter-productive in a civilized society, may declare that the measure could only be accepted if such-and-such facts could be produced. And they may believe that this opposition is fairly solid, because these facts are extremely unlikely.

But what if the advocates of these measures are able to influence the facts? ...

Of course, I am not saying we are in a police state today. I am not even saying that specific measures would turn our country into a police state. All I am saying is that it is possible to see how repeated application of certain lines of argument could result in a police state.

Update

Here's some evidence to support my conjecture:

• "Up against the buffers": Fact and fiction about the existing 28 day pre-charge detention limit (Liberty, 10 June 2008)
• BBC News 10 June 2008 quoting Liberty Director Shami Chakrabarti

Does Misunderstanding Work?

Having recommended an interesting paper by Max Abrahms, discussed in my recent post Does Terrorism Work?, Bruce Schneier has now posted a longer commentary about Correspondent Inference Theory, in which he makes the following important point.

"Perversely, Bush’s misinterpretation of terrorists' motives actually helps prevent them from achieving their goals."

This follows logically from Abrahms' paper, although I can't see anything perverse about it. Surely the point is that Bush's failure (or refusal) to appreciate the motives of the terrorists works here to Bush's advantage.

Leaders in conflict situations often fail to appreciate the motives of the other side. But sometimes they may understand more than they admit. Pretending to misunderstand is a well-established tactic. Not just against terrorists but against political opponents.

So does it make any difference (to the course of history) how much Bush really understands?

Terrorism as Farce

Two recent themes on this blog (farce and terrorism) seem to be converging. The Register describes the attacks in London and Glasgow using the language of slapstick:

• Beavis and Butthead in London jihad (June 29th)
  
• Journos join Krazy Klown jihadis in slapstick idiocy (July 2nd)

(via Bruce Schneier)

Journalists and politicians described the offending vehicles as car bombs, but this is inaccurate flattery. (Some people may have motives of their own for talking up the security threat.) The vehicles were indeed loaded with gas canisters and petrol and nails, but without a decent source of oxygen there was no chance of an explosion.

On the assumption that the plotters actually wanted to produce an explosion, the Register characterizes the plotters as ignorant, incompetent and/or lazy for failing to do any research or test. The plotters eventually managed to set fire to a jeep at Glasgow Airport.

Did the plotters really want to kill and maim the British public? (Apparently several of them were hospital doctors. They could possibly have done more damage by staying at work, if we imagine that more people die from medical incompetence than from terrorism.) Or did they merely want to produce some dramatic pictures for the television news?

As I've pointed out before, it is not necessary for terrorists to kill and maim people every time. In the past, some plotters have sent warnings so that the relevant area can be evacuated, and television cameras set up, before the bomb goes off. Presumably the idea is to get maximum media coverage for your cause without alienating the more ambivalent of your supporters.

A burning vehicle is certainly more photogenic than an explosion, and much safer, which is why there are so many petrol fires in action movies. But the plotters certainly don't come out of this particular episode with the style and glamour of a James Bond, or even a Che Guevara. The Register characterizes them as ignorant or incompetent. Or were the plotters themselves ambivalent about their actions - unconsciously sabotaging their own drama - rushing around making fools of themselves, like the characters in a well-scripted farce?

See also

• Bruce Schneier: Portrait of the Modern Terrorist as an Idiot (June 2007); Interviewed by Scott Horton (April 2008)
  
• Scribe: "Pop" Idol given a whole new meaning

Does Terrorism Work?

Bruce Schneier points to a fascinating research article called Why Terrorism Does Not Work by Max Abrahms, published in International Security.

The paper starts by investigating whether (and under what conditions) terrorism works. Contradicting some recent works that have described terrorism as a successful strategy, the author provides evidence that terrorist groups have a success rate of only 7 percent.

The paper also argues that terrorism against civilian targets has a lower success rate than terrorism against military targets.

The author explains this phenomenon using something called correspondent inference theory, which is a version of the POSIWID principle found in psychology. The theory suggests that when we are trying to infer the motives of other people, we base our thinking on the expected (short-term) effects of their actions.

So if the immediate effects of terrorist activity are to cause

1. death and destruction
2. massive clamp-down and over-reaction by the authorities
3. victimization (and subsequent radicalization) of communities thought to be associated with the terrorist groups

then it seems natural to suppose that these effects (rather than any stated policy aims or demands) represent the true motive of the terrorist activity.

Of course this thinking is self-reinforcing. If it seems unlikely that terrorism could possibly succeed in achieving its stated aims and demands, then it is more likely that we will impute alternative motives to the terrorists (e.g. "they're just out to destroy our way of life"), and this makes our governments all the more unwilling to accede to any demands.

But historically, there are some terrorist groups have succeeded. If a terrorist group selects tactics known to have a higher chance of success, then we might at least suppose that they are serious about their stated aims. Whereas if a terrorist group selects tactics that haven't worked for other groups in the past, we might well wonder what they're really up to.


Source: Max Abrahms, Why Terrorism Does Not Work. International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 42–78 (pdf).


Related post: Does Misunderstanding Work? (July 2007)

Timing and Regime Change

Two days after the regime change in the UK, the new Prime Minister was not woken up with the news of an attempted car bombing in Central London. (He was not told until 6am, and was displeased when he heard that the new Home Secretary had been told hours ago.) The following day, there was an attack on Glasgow Airport. The country remains in a state of critical alert.

Nobody seems to have any doubt that the timing of these incidents is related to the regime change in the UK. But what exactly is the point?

From a political point of view, the timing is bad for the Conservative Party. Instead of their devoting Gordon Brown's first weekend as Prime Minister to mounting the first of many attacks on his policies and personality, they were obliged to express the usual outrage at the attacks, and their general support (subject to the usual exclusions and caveats) for all necessary security measures.

Gordon Brown and Jacqui Smith appeared on television dressed just right - he looking statesmanlike, she looking like a plain clothes policewoman - and the public will be suitably calmed.

In the past, conspiracy theorists have often imagined that the main beneficiary of security attacks has been the state machinery itself, and have tried to find links between the perpetrators and the security forces. For all I know, false allegations about this week's incidents may already be circulating on the Internet.

But if we discount explanations of this kind, we are left with a puzzle. Why do the plotters of these attacks care whether Blair or Brown is Prime Minister - what possible difference does it make to their supposed agenda?

But that's just the point - it doesn't. The underlying message of these attacks is that, as far as the plotters are concerned, nothing has changed. And presumably nothing would change if the Conservatives were elected either. This message is reinforced by the timing, and therefore helps to explain the timing.

In other words, the trigger for the events is the non-occurrence (in the eyes of the plotters) of real regime change. This is another example of an intriguing phenomenon - positive effects produced by negative causes. (Although the reality of regime change may be a matter of opinion, it is the opinions of the plotters and their potential supporters that we need to look at first if we wish to understand the timing of their actions.)

Inactivity

In a post entitled J.D. Salinger and al Qaeda's "Chinese Democracy" Rodger raises a question about the apparent lack of al Qaeda activity on American soil since 9/11. He compares this with the rare artistic output of perfectionists like J.D. Salinger and Axl Rose.

Rodger describes this inactivity as a lack of productivity on al Qaeda's part. But given the enormous financial and psychological cost that America and other countries continue to incur for fear of al Qaeda, there seems little need for unnecessary activity. If al Qaeda can now achieve a very large effect from an unsubstantiated rumour or half-baked plot, this suggests they have attained an extremely efficient state.

It is a well-known phenomenon that inactivity can trigger activity. (See previous posts Nothing Causes Action, Negative Thinking.) In the case of fear, this phenomenon may be amplified - nameless dread being more powerful than any specific threat.

Glory Glory Knockdown Argument

`I don't know what you mean by "glory",' Alice said.

Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. `Of course you don't -- till I tell you. I meant "there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"'

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The latest UK Government plans to deglorify terrorism apparently take a POSIWID line - inferring the purpose of a speech from its effect on an audience. Robin Wilton raises two concerns with this (note1).

Standards of proof - How can a law officer demonstrate the intent to glorify?

Liability - If glory is defined in terms of the effect on an audience, does this shift responsibility / power away from the speaker and onto the audience?

There is of course an important difference between the effect on an audience (taken as a whole) and the effect on a very small number of audience members. Is it reasonable to infer the purpose of a speech from its effect on a tiny fringe of listeners? (note2)

But we can also reflect the POSIWID line back onto the Government plan. What is the likely effect of Government legislation on the people who are supposed to be vulnerable to incitement? Might it possibly reinforce a sense of alienation and isolation, leading to further glorification instead of deglorification. We have had counterproductive antiterrorism measures before, including the stupid ban on Sinn Fein which resulted in their words being spoken by actors. But this time around, actions that lead to the glorification of terrorism become illegal - and for consistency's sake this should surely include any Government actions that lead to the glorification of terrorism, since the proposed legislation itself defines intent in terms of effect! Ha!

The UK Government also intends to introduce powers to control places of worship that "foment extremism". On past form, any official definition of extremism is likely to be sweeping and all-inclusive, both in wording (note3) and in interpretation (note4). I confidently expect extremism to include beliefs about heaven and hell, good and evil, evolution and reincarnation, and so on. (Well at least we Buddhists will be all right then.)

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Notes

1. Robin Wilton's comment (8th Oct 2005) was posted at the following URL, which is no longer available http://blogs.sun.com/roller/comments/racingsnake?anchor=uk_law_revised_on_glorification
2. See earlier posts on DogWhistle Politics (March 2005) and Purpose and Probability (Sept 2005).
3. See post by Masood Mortazavi on Tony Blair's definition of terrorism, with my comments (Sept 2005).
4. See discussion of the use of the Terrorism Act against Walter Wolfgang (Sept 2005).

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