False Sense of Security

According to the dictionary, a false sense of security is a feeling of being safer than one really is. Apparently that's a bad thing.

Peter Sandman is a strong believer in what he calls precaution advocacy - to arouse some healthy outrage and use it to mobilize people to take precautions or demand precautions. He has helped environmental groups arouse public concern about the need for recycling, the dangers of factory emissions, etc. In such contexts, his concern is that people are disregarding or underestimating some category of risk, and he is urging the introduction of appropriate precautions - whether individual or collective.

There are countless risk and security experts who take a similar position - for example, advocating greater diligence in corporate security, especially cybersecurity.

However, as Dr Sandman acknowledges, the notion of a false sense of security is often used rhetorically, suggesting that a given regulation or other precaution is not only unnecessary but even counter-productive, making people careless or complacent. This argument is sometimes based on the notion of risk homeostasis or risk compensation - that people adjust their behaviour to maintain a comfortable level of risk. The classic example is people with seatbelts and airbags driving faster and more recklessly.

Dr Sandman notes that the rhetoric can sometimes be deployed by both sides of an argument - for example "gun controls create a false sense of security" versus "guns create a false sense of security". What this suggests is that the rhetoric is often about other people - the implication is that We have a true sense of security, but They would be misled.

The notion of a false sense of security also arises in connection with security theatre - a performance that may have little real impact on security, but is intended to reassure people that Something Is Being Done. When Bruce Schneier introduced this term in his 2003 book, he regarded security theatre as fraudulent, and believed it was always a Bad Thing. However, he later came to acknowledge that security theatre, while still deceptive and potentially problematic, could sometimes be valuable. His example is security bracelets on newborn babies, which don't do much to protect against the actual but extremely small risk of abduction, but do a great deal to calm anxious parents. If Dr Sandman's precaution advocacy is targetted at situations of High Hazard, Low Outrage (in other words, people not worrying enough), then Security Theatre could be legitimately targetted at situations of Low Hazard, High Outrage (people worrying too much).

So perhaps sometimes giving people a false sense of security is ethically justified?

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Peter Glaskowsky, Bruce Schneier's New View on Security Theater (CNET, 9 April 2008)

Peter Sandman, False Sense of Security (25 May 2018), Precaution Advocacy (undated)

Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear (2003), In Praise of Security Theatre (Wired, 25 January 2007)

Gerald Wilde, Risk homeostasis theory: an overview (Injury Prevention Vol 4 No 2, 1998)

Wikipedia: Risk Compensation, Security Theatre

Related posts: Surveillance and its Effects (May 2005), Technical Security and Context (September 2005), Hard Cases Make Bad Law (September 2009), The Illusion of Architecture (September 2012), Anxiety as a Cost (January 2013), Listening for Trouble (June 2019), Lie Detectors at Airports (April 2022)


Updated 28 June 2019. Thanks to Peter Sandman for comments.

Back Door Steps

Theresa May used to be rather keen on back doors. As Home Secretary until her move to Downing Street, she was responsible for the Investigatory Powers Bill, which insisted on back doors to enable the security forces to snoop on private communications. Now she insists that Britain will not remain in Europe by the back door. So what's wrong with back doors all of a sudden?

Now you might think I'm just making a snarky political point. Obviously the back door metaphor has a different meaning in the two contexts. But there is an important connection here, so please bear with me.

The European Data Protection Supervisor is dead against encryption back doors. By mandating encryption back doors, the UK therefore appears to place itself outside the European circle of trust. The proposed legislation would mean that any UK company or UK-based facility might be subject to an equipment interference warrant (aka back door), and would not be permitted to reveal whether it did or not. Aside from the competitive disadvantage that might follow from this potential vulnerability, UK companies and UK-based services would be challenged to demonstrate compliance with the European Data Protection Regulation, and might therefore be prevented from holding data on any European citizen. There is going to be a single market for data, and we wouldn't have access to it. Another blow for the UK service industry.

So evidently Mrs May is right. Backdoor membership of the EU is not on the table.

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Anushka Asthana, No staying in the EU by the back door, says Theresa May (Guardian, 31 August 2016)

Jennifer Baker, Encryption backdoors appear on EU data chief’s ban wishlist (Ars Technica, 25 July 2016)

Lucy Mair, Supreme court strikes down Home Office's back-door changes to immigration rules (Guardian, 18 July 2012)

John Naughton, Theresa May’s surveillance plans should worry us all (Guardian, 12 June 2016)

Iain Thomson, FBI Director wants 'adult conversation' about backdooring encryption (The Register, 31 August 2016)

@TheRegister backdoors are like hookers they do what you pay them for but never have them exclusively!

— Frank Koster (@bluegoaindian) September 2, 2016

Smart Guns

Just suppose that smart guns were safer than ordinary guns.

For example, if someone grabbed your gun and tried to point it at you. If it was a smart gun you'd be perfectly safe because there is a fool-proof mechanism that prevents its use by an unauthorized person.

As with any technological advance, some people are sceptical. How much do you trust new technology? Suppose the gun doesn't work when you need it. Maybe an electromagnetic pulse (triggered by terrorists or natural solar activity) might take out all weapons in the area. Or maybe the bad guys (or the FBI) can hack into this mechanism and disable your gun before they attack you.

Meanwhile, like many technological advances, there are political implications. In the USA, the key question is whether such a mechanism might help reduce gun violence. Some gun control activists think such a mechanism would be pretty irrelevant.

But that doesn't stop the gun rights activists freaking out at the prospect of any damn technology on their precious weaponry. A shop owner in the US claims to have received death threats from pro-gun lobbyists for offering to sell the weapons. Meanwhile, as Joseph Steinberg suggests, an obsession with smart guns may inhibit other technological innovations that could make guns and gun-owning safer.

The belief here is that once these smart guns are available, by a process of technological determinism, they will become irresistible to legislators. Before long, they fear, you won't be able to buy regular guns.

Obviously that's a cause worth killing for.

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David Kopel, Brady Center lawsuit to use “smart” gun mandate to trigger handgun ban in New Jersey (Washington Post 22 May 2014)

Karen McVeigh, Gun control groups accuse New Jersey of ignoring 'smart gun' law (Guardian 21 May 2014)

Michael S. Rosenwald, Maryland dealer, under pressure from gun-rights activists, drops plan to sell smart gun (Washington Post, 1 May 2014)

Joseph Steinberg, Why You Should Be Concerned About The New 'Smart Guns' (Whether You Love Or Hate Guns) (Forbes 4 May 2014)

Nicholas Tufnell, Smart guns: How smart are they? (BBC News, 23 May 2014)

Eugene Volokh, Smart guns, electromagnetic pulse, and planning for unknown-probability dangers (Washington Post 23 May 2014)


See also Batman/Catwoman: Trail of the Gun (hat tip @ChBrain).

Related post Technological Determism (December 2020)

On Reputation

From @CJFDillow on the externalities of superinjunctions.

"People can allege that Jemima Khan is shagging Jeremy Clarkson and say that the press isn’t reporting this because of a superinjunction. ... In this way, Ms Khan’s reputation is damaged by the existence of super injunctions (though the social cost of this is mitigated by the fact that Mr Clarkson‘s reputation is enhanced)."

Ms Khan attracted a lot of publicity to herself when she chose to protest about various allegations about her and Mr Clarkson that had been circulated on Twitter. Most people looked at the allegations and dismissed them as highly unlikely. The story, repeated with glamorous pictures in all newspapers, has merely served to remind us about her wealth and beauty, and has probably only enhanced her reputation. Perhaps the real purpose of her protest was to deflect attention and credibility from some other allegations. (See my post on Google-spinning.)

Chris assumes that Ms Khan's reputation would be sullied if she were discovered to have had a relationship with anyone outside the usual round of actors and sportsmen and other good looking airheads. Although I'm not a fan of Mr Clarkson, I imagine that a wealthy and bored woman might find a discreet relationship with him to be quite interesting, and I can't see that her reputation would be particularly damaged. It's not as if she were caught attending one of Mr Berlusconi's or Mr Mosley's parties, or spilling out of nightclubs in a dishevelled state.

Meanwhile, Chris assumes that Mr Clarkson's reputation is enhanced by these allegations. Again, I can't see that a popular and happily married journalist wants to be associated with bored heiresses, let alone by their indignant denials.

Purpose of Denial 3

The more the American mainstream media deny that President Obama is a Moslem, the more Americans choose to believe that he is.

Apparently this belief is more prevalent among college-educated Republicans than the rest of the population. How Republicans Learn That Obama Is Muslim (New Republic, 27 August 2010) This raises some intriguing questions about the relationship between education and knowledge.

Jeff Poor suggests that the media are to blame. "By consistently using questions about Obama's faith and his citizenship as fodder to demean conservatives, specifically the Tea Party movement and thereby creating a general mistrust by saying vile things, have the mainstream media perpetuated the very allegations they are abhorred by (sic)?" (Newsbusters, 19 August 2010) At least on this point, Charlie Brooker seems to agree. "Seriously, broadcasters, journalists: just give up now. Because either you're making things worse, or no one's paying attention anyway."  'Ground Zero mosque'? The reality is less provocative (Guardian 23 August 2010). Brooker complains that the terms of the debate are grossly misleading, and grudgingly admires right-wingers for their ability to create snappy-but-misleading nicknames – like fun-size chocolate bars and the Ground Zero mosque. Buzzwords for blowhards (Guardian 30 August 2010).

Jeff Poor quotes CNN political analyst James Carville, who describes himself as "flummoxed" by this result, and claims that "the quality of information to people today is exponentially higher than it was in 19th century England". Now I wouldn't necessarily expect a political journalist to know what the word "exponential" meant, but I wonder whether the quality is higher at all.

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Once upon a time, some people were bothered whether Disraeli was Christian or Jew, and some people were uncomfortable about electing Kennedy as a Catholic president. But they are now mainly remembered for what they achieved while in office, not their religious affiliation. Meanwhile, Mrs Thatcher's legacy is not feminism but Thatcherism. Obama will not be remembered for his birthplace, or the religion of his forefathers, nor even for being the first black president; he will be remembered for the successes and failures of his presidency. And perhaps one day, people will wonder why anyone cared whether he was a Moslem or not, and moderate Moslems will be as accepted in mainstream American politics as Catholics are now. (Let it not be forgotten that large sums of money were once raised from American Catholics to support Irish terrorism.)

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John T. McGreevy and R. Scott Appleby Catholics, Muslims, and the Mosque Controversy (New York Review, 27 August 2010)

Adam Serwer, Build More Mosques (American Prospect, August 26, 2010)

Does Basel want bigger banks?

@Peston via @diane1859 "Basel tilts playing field further towards big banks. It wasn't supposed to be this way."

Here's the dilemma. The official purpose of banking regulation is to protect the whole system from risk. But the actual effect of controlling each bank separately (whether in terms of capital ratios or any other measure) is to encourage the concentration of risk, which makes the whole system more risky.

Counter-productive regulation is an extremely common phenomenon. Stafford Beer's POSIWID principle tells us that the de facto purpose of a complex system is often at odds with the official purpose.

True systems thinking on the part of legislators and regulators might lead us to more effective and appropriate ways of regulating the whole system than simply imposing controls on the individual players within the system. But what's the chance of that happening?

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Jane Merriman, Big banks winners from new contingent capital move (Reuters, 27 August 2010)

Related posts Does Britain need smaller banks? (April 2009), Bearing Limit and Financial Regulation (September 2010)

Purpose of Counter-Terrorism 2

Commonly described as heir to various great American and European writers (Joyce, Pynchon, DeLillo), and compared with writers from Gerald Manley Hopkins to Dostoevsky, David Foster Wallace died earlier this month, apparently at his own hand. By chance, I had just bought a book of his essays, and I was looking forward to reading his review of Tracy Austin's "autobiography", and his report on McCain's 2000 campaign. [See my post US Election 2008: Sincerity versus Authenticity]

Last year Wallace wrote a short polemic in the Atlantic about terrorism and counter-terrorism, called Just Asking, in which he suggested the following thought-experiment: that instead of reducing American liberty for the sake of security against terrorism, America could decide to keep its liberties and accept a certain level of terrorism. The victims of these acts would be democratic martyrs, sacrificial witnesses to the eternal values of American liberty.

Is this a monstrous idea, he asks? Then why do we not also regard it as monstrous to sacrifice 40,000 Americans every year to the liberties of the motor car?

Two hundred years ago, Benjamin Franklin warned of the false trade-off between safety and liberty. Now it seems to be impossible to have a serious political debate about this, either in America or in Europe. We apparently have no choice - the decisions are made on our behalf by elected politicians - or worse, by stupid functionaries.

And Wallace ends with two rhetorical questions: "Have we actually become so selfish and scared that we don’t even want to consider whether some things trump safety? What kind of future does that augur?"

Cameras and Trust

Here's a side-thought arising from something I said in my previous post on the Purpose of Anonymity.

"Obviously this ban [on camera phones in election booths] doesn't actually prevent voters from selling their votes - votes were being bought and sold long before cameras were invented - but the lack of photographic evidence reduces the economic efficiency of the transaction."

In some societies, nearly everybody has a mobile phone, and nearly every phone can take crude photographs. And while people often leave proper cameras at home, except on special occasions, most people carry a mobile at all time. This has led to a heightened expectation of photographic evidence - including evidence of wrong-doing. For example, gang members recording antisocial behaviour (such as "happy-slapping" - a physically violent form of bullying framed as slapstick) to boost their social standing within the gang.

The same technology can of course be used for more praiseworthy purposes: for example, to record interviews and video diaries from areas where traditional journalism is constrained and independent journalists are banned. The smuggled pictures and video perform the function of samizdat.

As it happens, both happy-slapping and samizdat are subversive, although in very different ways. But the justice system also relies on photographic evidence: older readers may remember the "twenty seven eight-by-ten colour glossy pictures with circles and arrows and a paragraph on the back of each one" taken by Officer Obie in evidence against one Arlo Guthrie for littering on Thanksgiving [source: Alice's Restaurant (lyrics) (track)]. And then of course there are surveillance cameras ...

But this widespread expectation of photographic evidence devalues oral testimony. We don't trust words as much these days: if there aren't any pictures, it probably isn't true. In the past, even bribery and corruption relied on trust, because there wasn't any alternative; the camera (or rather the way society increasingly uses cameras) undermines trust.

Travel Hopefully

The quaint licensing laws of the United Kingdom used to contain the notion of the "bona fide traveller". At certain times and places (Sundays? Scotland and Wales?) inns were not permitted to serve alcohol to local customers, but could only serve genuine tourists, people who travelled "in good faith".

In some parts of the country, people would go on Sunday coach trips to the next town, where they could drink as travellers. This was certainly against the spirit and letter of the law - they were travelling in order to drink, not travelling "in good faith" - but they usually got away with it.

I remember hearing the great war correspondent James Cameron tell a stirring tale of having battled his way back to Scotland across several continents, perhaps from some remote corner of the Korean or Vietnam War, only to be denied a drink in the pub nearest his home because as a local he didn't count as a "bona fide traveller".

Today, in the photogenic but dysfunctional Terminal Five building at Heathrow Airport, the airport authority hoped to verify travellers' bona fides by taking fingerprints. Are you permitted to buy cheap gin? Are you permitted to get on this charabanc to Rhyl, with or without baggage?

Biometrics and identity cards can maybe tell the authorities who you are and where you live, but they are not enough to reveal your intentions, your bona fides. Did you pack this bag yourself? Has a mysterious stranger given you anything to carry? Are you conspiring to overthrow, put down, or to destroy any government by force? (tick YES or NO)

BAA claims that fingerprints are required to prevent terrorists from stealing into the UK, but of course what they really mean is "known" terrorists - people whose names and fingerprints are already on the blacklist, or people who are already "wanted" in other countries. Maybe we need some more technology - perhaps lie detectors, or the "tunnel of truth".

Meanwhile, there are suspicions in some quarters that the physical layout and passenger processing are principally designed not to promote the security of the country and its transport operations, but to promote the commercial profitability of the airport and its retail operations. Fingerprints overruled by the Information Commissioner, they are going to take photographs instead. Oh well, so that's all right then. Rhyl, here I come.

See also: Heathrow Terminal Five, Actually You Can't Fly Either

Shoes and the Devil

When Bruce Schneier passes through Heathrow, he skips the security queues by going through the fast track lane. So he has nothing much to lose by revealing a vulnerability in the arrangements for checking shoes safety - Defeating the Shoe Scanning Machine at Heathrow.

But many of his readers travel in economy class. They are hoping that the authorities do not make the shoe-testing more onerous than it already is.

Before publishing vulnerabilities, one need to judge the likely outcomes. Perhaps some people think it would be a good thing if air travellers are subjected to further stupid harassment (and risk of foot infection) at Heathrow, because this would reduce the quantity of pointless tourism and even more pointless business meetings.

But the people who would suffer the worst from a further tightening of shoe-related security would be fashion shoe designers, with carry-on bags stuffed with thousands of pounds worth of glamorous stilettos and supercool trainers. Perhaps Schneier should publish that vulnerability as well, drive shoe design underground, and force fashion victims to wear sensible shoes instead!

There are many strange beliefs and customs associated with shoes, some even stranger than the superstitious security checks currently practised at airports around the world. Not far from Heathrow is St Dunstan's Church in Cranford Park. It was St Dunstan who, according to legend, once nailed a pair of horseshoes to the Devil's feet, and this is thought to explain the use of the horseshoe as a good luck charm.

Modern technology has taken the horseshoe magnet and produced an electromagnetic equivalent. Before we can be permitted to board an aeroplane, our possessions must be purified by contact with magnets, so that we can be sure they are safe of the influence of the devil. (Magnets were first described in an ancient Chinese text called The Book of the Devil Valley Master.)

Makes about as much sense as the normal explanation.

Wikipedia: Horseshoe, St Dunstan
Link: St Dunstan's, Cranford Park

Easy Pickings?

Bruce Schneier picks up a story about the police putting warning stickers on vehicles with tempting parcels for the casual thief. [Conyers Police Department warns shoppers to protect valuables in cars, Rockdale Citizen, Friday, December 07, 2007] Bruce thinks the police are just helping the thieves.

In London, the Metropolitan Police put up notices, apparently addressing car thieves, advertising "Free Satnav in this area". Presumably the intended effect is to remind car owners not to leave their satnav in the car.

In contrast, in the city of Leicester, the police have resorted to handing out free cloths, to wipe the satnav marks from the windscreen. [Source: Leicester Police website] This appears to have exactly the same intended effect - to remind car owners about the vulnerability.

Obviously there is a risk that these warnings may sometimes trigger crime rather than help prevent it. But the principle of publishing vulnerabilities is based on the assumption that this information helps law-abiding people to defend themselves from attack more than it helps the attackers. (There are lots of comments in Bruce's blog discussing whether the same principles apply here as to software vulnerabilities.)

Even if these measures resulted in a short-term increase in the levels of crime, they might seem justified if the longer-term effect was to teach car-owners better security habits.

Childhood Diseases

Should children be protected against minor diseases? Or are childhood diseases a normal (and perhaps even necessary) part of growing up? 

Some doctors are now recommending routine vaccination against chicken pox (varicella) - there is a suggestion that it might be combined with the (already controversial) MMR vaccine to produce MMRV [BBC News November 8th 2007]. 

Chicken pox killed six children in the UK and Irish Republic last year, and there were 112 cases involving severe complications. So there is certainly a risk. But is this risk high enough to warrant action? Each mass vaccination campaign has

• financial costs - could the same resources deployed elsewhere have delivered greater medical benefits to a greater number of people?

• medical side-effects - possible negative reactions to the vaccination itself in some children, reduced protection against related diseases such as shingles

• social costs - fear of side-effects (whether founded or unfounded) reducing the take-up of all vaccines, not just this one

But I have a more general concern. If this proposal makes sense, then it would make sense for every other infectious disease that kills a small number of people every year. Medical researchers think they understand the effect of a single vaccine on the human immune system, or even a compound vaccine such as MMR. But how would it be if a child never got ill, because every possible disease was preempted by vaccination? Would the immune system develop normally, or would it be weak from lack of exercise? Would new diseases emerge to fill the gap? Will medical research tell us the answers to these questions before it is too late? 

Childhood disease involves some suffering, and a tiny risk of complications and even death, and most parents accept that. If I wanted to protect my children totally from any suffering or risk, then they wouldn't learn to cross the road or ride a bicycle or climb trees; they wouldn't be allowed to use the kettle or the toaster, or bathe in more than 3cm of water; and they certainly wouldn't have any contact with the opposite sex until they were at least 25 years old. This is of course ridiculous - I would be condemning them to a life-without-life. 

While my heart goes out to those parents who have lost their children to childhood disease, I don't think the answer is to eliminate childhood disease altogether. It is a normal part of growing up: it develops the immune system, and equally importantly it develops confidence in the immune system. A child can feel poorly one week, with spots all over her face, and then be back at school the following week: this experience engenders a deep belief in your ability to recover, a belief that however bad you feel right now, you should feel better tomorrow. 

What doesn't kill you makes you stronger.

Update

The Chief Executive of RoSPA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents) made a similar point in his 2007 Annual Report.

"Rather than adopt the extremist protectionism of ‘cotton wool kids’ our argument is that a skinned knee or a twisted ankle in a challenging and exciting play environment is not just acceptable, it is a positive necessity in order to educate our children and to prepare them for a complex, dangerous world, in which healthy, robust activity is more a national need than ever before."

Of course this is not an argument dismissing safety precautions altogether, and my blogpost should not be read as an argument against all vaccinations - merely an argument against the extreme idea that we need to vaccinate against every possible condition.

See also

Gever Tulley: 5 dangerous things you should let your kids do (Ted Talks, March 2007)

Security Theatre

Steve Swain, formerly with the Metropolitan Police and now a consultant with Control Risks, questions the belief that security cameras prevent crime or terrorism.

"I don't know of a single incident where CCTV has actually been used to spot, apprehend or detain offenders in the act. ... The presence of CCTV is irrelevant for those who want to sacrifice their lives to carry out a terrorist act." [CNN August 3rd, 2007, via Bruce Schneier]

Swain has also written an article in the latest issue of his company's newsletter challenging the fantasy of technology.

"In today's threat environment, technology for law enforcement agencies is seen as the answer to all our prayers; all seeing, infallible, indefatigable. If only." [Perspective, July 2007, pdf]

Meanwhile, the City of New York is planning to spend $90m million (annual running costs $8 million) on a network of security cameras, code-named "Ring of Steel". New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly seems unconcerned that there is no positive evidence of any deterrent effect.

"We don't know acts that may have been planned that -- because of the surveillance and deterrence systems that are in place -- did not go forward." [CNN August 3rd, 2007]

Seems a remarkably thin justification for spending public money. So if security cameras don't actually prevent crime and terrorism, what is their real purpose? Swain suggests two answers: investigation and public reassurance.

"You need to do this piece of theater so that if the terrorists are looking at you, they can see that you've got some measures in place."

Oh, right. Chief Wiggum rules okay.

Wikipedia: Clancy Wiggum
See also: The ineffectiveness of security cameras

Stress

According to the POSIWID principle, the purpose of some complex artefact or phenomenon is what it does. There are people who see positive value in stress. There are also people who, while claiming to dislike stress, still act in ways that increase stress for themselves and other people.

Fight / Flight - Stress provides energy for contingencies and emergencies. It may unlock hidden reserves of power and creativity.

Selection - Stress may act as a selection mechanism. It identifies and promotes those tough enough to withstand stress.

Motivation - Stress may act as a stimulant. Some managers deliberately put their staff, suppliers and other people under stress, in the belief that this will produce better outcomes.

Pleasure - Freud's pleasure principle is based on the balance between excitement and calm.

Trust - Perhaps the most effective way of establishing authentic trust between individuals and teams is to have a shared experience of stress. This is sometimes called "going though fire together".

Explanation - Like many other psychosocial phenomena, stress is a totem in some organizations (in other words, held up as a cause and explanation of all sorts of phenomena), and is taboo in other organizations (in other words, not able to be acknowledged or cited as an excuse). The effects and symptoms of stress are likely to be very different between these organizations.

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Roger Dobson, Does stress help us succeed? (Independent, 4 May 2011)

Pork Scratchings

Over the past five years, US states with Republican congressmen have got more security money than states with Democratic congressmen. Bruce Schneier, in a post called The Square Root of Terrorist Intent, refers to this phenomenon as "pork".

On the POSIWID blog, we like to dig through the undergrowth of politics to find the truffles of causality. Why do some states get more money than others? Is it because the Republican congressmen have been more effective than the Democratic congressmen at getting their snouts in the trough? Or is it because states with Republican congressmen are inherently more vulnerable?

By choosing to elect more Democrats in the recent elections, the American people evidently lean towards the second explanation.

In the same post, Schneier goes on to discuss a formula that is used to allocate security funds in the USA, which includes taking the square root of some measure of terrorist intent. (The formula is also discussed by Eileen Sullivan on CQ.com: The Root of All Terror, with lots of sarcastic comments on Wired Blogs.)

Although I haven't seen the formula myself, I can't see any problem with square roots as such. Square roots are used in many good formulas, and its presence in this particular formula makes it apparent that this is an attempt to perform a proper calculation rather than the usual vague waffle. Which perhaps explains why some people are resisting or mocking the square root - because they are uncomfortable with the idea that such things might be subject to calculation at all. Without the square root, they might well have ignored the whole thing.

Can we not measure intent? Surely that's what marketing departments do - measure and manipulate the intent of customers and prospective customers. We can also measure attention, and there is a strong link (although it clearly requires some interpretation and analysis) between intention and attention. Modern ("asymmetric") warfare is largely about altering the intentions of the enemy - which makes it effectively a branch of marketing.

By declaring some national assets for special attention (Old MacDonald’s Heavy Petting Zoo, Clinton's Apple and Pork Festival), this presumably alters the intentions of the enemy. Can pork-barrel politics keep up with a constantly shifting threat? Can pigs fly?

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Meanwhile, another use of square roots in a security formula is explained in Can Statistics Help Catch Terrorists (BBC News, 11 Jan 2010)

The Money Trap

An interesting BBC television documentary last night on banks and credit cards: Panorama July 2nd, 2006 (video available). Reported three detailed case studies of people who were permitted (possibly encouraged) to run up impossible debts - two of whom committed suicide. Also provided some inside insight into banking policies that encourage further lending to people in trouble.

The programme featured a whistleblower who accuses the banks of putting profits before what she calls a "duty of care" for the customer, describing their lending practices as "irresponsible".

Clearly many people still have the idea that banks are (or should be) infused with noble ideals of duty and responsibility, and they express disappointment and outrage when the banking industry appears to fall short of these ideals.

Bank executives may well argue that their primary duty and responsibility is to the financially responsible majority of their customers. There is a utilitarian argument (greatest good, greatest number) that the survival of the bank is more important than the survival of one customer. But of course this notion of duty happily coincides with good profits for shareholders and high remuneration for the executives themselves.

So what is the purpose of a bank again?

del.icio.us tags: POSIWID
Technorati tags: banking credit debt POSIWID responsibility trust

Essay Fraud

What is the purpose of EssayFraud.org? According to the organization website, its members provide freelance research and composition services to students, and it expects students to use these services responsibly.

If a consumer contracts a freelance writer to research and compose an example document from which the consumer intends to glean unique insights/viewpoints on a given topic, the consumer must properly cite that writer and/or that writer's employing Web site when writing his/her own paper.

Yeah, right.

Some people might think that the best clue about the purpose of EssayFraud.org is contained in the name of the organization. See my posts on Cheating 1 and 2.

Essay Fraud is currently engaged in a campaign to encourage students to buy American essays (sorry, I should have said research insights) rather than cheaper services from Pakistan or Ukraine.

The wider effect of the Essay Fraud phenomenon is that essay outsourcing undermines the supposed purposes of the American education system. If Americans are paying Pakistanis and Ukrainians to write their essays, it won't be long before Americans have to pay Pakistanis and Ukrainians to run their companies.

Whoops! According to some software industry leaders, this is already starting to happen. See my post on the Globally Integrated Enterprise.

Who is being clever here, and who is being stupid? (In a later post, Jack van Hoof calls this Paying to Stay Dumb.)

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Comments to this post have now been switched off.

Valentine's Day

I have always been wary of Valentine's Day, especially since reading Thomas Hardy's ironically named novel Far From the Madding Crowd.

Hardy takes the title from the poem Gray's Elegy, which includes the line "Far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife" - but Hardy's characters manage to create ignoble strife even in an apparently peaceful countryside setting. And in Hardy's novel, it is a Valentine's Day card that causes all the trouble.

Isn't that just the purpose of Valentine's Day - to cause trouble?

Scott Adams sees the whole thing as a hunter-gatherer competition, in which the alpha males get the best flowers (and consequently the best women). Meanwhile Bruce Schneier sees this as an opportunity for trust to be broken, and broken trust to be exposed.

What a romantic way to celebrate the life and death of Saint Valentine!

Technorati Tag: POSIWID

Female Pleasure 2

Following my previous post on the purpose of female pleasure, my attention has been drawn (by this post in the Now Economy blog) to a piece of research (pdf) that suggests that oxytocin increases trusting behaviour. (The Now Economy blog raises important questions about the reseach method for measuring trusting behaviour, but I'm not going to address these questions here.)

Oxytocin has often been cited as a mechanism linking female pleasure to a range of social and biological effects.

• Oxytocin is an altruistic hormone, a love hormone (Michael Odent)
  
• Oxytocin deficiency enhances stress, obesity and psychotic behavior, impairs cognitive functions and increases breast-cancer risk. (Wai Says)
  

Now if sexual pleasure makes you trust people, then POSIWID suggests that this may be a secondary purpose of sex. We may then intervene in this causal pattern by abstaining prior to those activities where we wish to remain guarded. (For example, sportsmen are often temporarily separated from their bedmates before a major event.) This kind of intervention is similar to that of Ulysses and the Sirens, brilliantly analysed by Jon Elster.

Meanwhile Marnia Robinson and Gary Wilson argue that conventional sex tends to over-stimulate the pleasure/reward center deep within the brain. Over time, this leads to subconscious defensiveness and emotional distance between partners. Once uneasiness enters an intimate relationship, the bond between the partners tends to weaken, ultimately producing less oxytocin. In their view, biology's agenda unravels relationships over time despite oxytocin's bonding properties, and they advocate alternative practices that maintain and increase oxytocin between partners - in other words, intervening to subvert what they believe to be biology's agenda.

So now we have two theories. One in which the quantity of trust depends on the quantity of oxytocin, and one in which the quantity of oxytocin depends on the quantity of trust.

If we can't tell which is the effect, and which the cause, then POSIWID becomes a spiral.

Dangerous Coffee

Airports are divided into two zones - landside and airside - with a security boundary between.

I have generally found that the sandwiches and drinks are cheaper on the landside. (One major UK retailer sells good sandwiches in its landside shops, but not in its airside shops). And in some airports the best coffee is landside.

Makes sense. Once the passengers have gone through security, they are captive. The airport can get an economic "rent" by making them pay more for food and drink while they're waiting for a flight. (Isn't that the real reason they want us to check in so early.)

I hate being ripped off. So I try to buy anything I need on the landside, before going through security. And at some airports, that includes coffee.

Oh, but you can't do that anymore. For security reasons, you now can't take coffee through from landside to airside. Yeah, what do you think I've got concealed in my latte - nail scissors?

Any stupid regulation can be justified by appealing to security. But it doesn't take much to work out who really benefits commercially from these so-called regulations.

See previous post No Fly on Us