Terrorism and Innovation

What is the purpose of security theatre at airports? To catch stupid terrorists? TSA boss Kip Hawley claims that this would be better than nothing.

"Clever terrorists can use innovative ways to exploit vulnerabilities. But don’t forget that most bombers are not, in fact, clever. Living bomb-makers are usually clever, but the person agreeing to carry it may not be super smart. Even if “all” we do is stop dumb terrorists, we are reducing risk." [TSA blog 21 October 2008]

In a reply to Bruce Schneier, Hawley adds

"Thanks for not taking a shot at me on my risk management point that even if we are just stopping dumb terrorists, we are reducing risk. You didn’t go for a clever rhetorical gimme, but instead raised the good point about transferring risk to outside the airport environment. That is a worthy discussion for another time." [Schneier on Security 28 October 2008]

Okay, here is a clever rhetorical gimme: the Atlantic has launched a New Contest: Can You Out-Lame the TSA?

Meanwhile the clever terrorists innovate.

"Intelligence shows that terrorists innovate in explosives formulas as well as the way they would bring them onboard an aircraft. That won’t change any time soon. If liquid restrictions are eased eventually it will be because of improved process and technology, not diminished threat." [TSA Blog 24 October 2008]

In other words, the effect of security theatre (Hawley doesn't admit that it is theatre of course, but then we wouldn't expect him to) is to force terrorism to evolve - to develop not only more clever terrorists but also less detectable tactics. Which in turn forces the TSA to acquire more and more expensive technology. The TSA blog is called The Evolution of Security.

But what about the Insecurity of Evolution? If the TSA were only facing a short-term threat there would be no reason to worry about the evolution of the threat over time, but that's obviously not the case. The requirements facing the TSA keep changing, and the TSA response is just to add more things to an already cumbersome and costly system. Things that were implemented incrementally in a series of panic responses to various incidents are now a permanent feature of our air travel experience (except for those wealthy enough to fly on private jets) - first shoes, then liquids, who knows (apart from the clever terrorists) what further troubles will be added in future?

At some point in the curve, air travel simply becomes non-viable. Bruce Schneier points out that the terrorists could easily switch to other targets. But more importantly, I hope travellers will switch to other modes of transport. At present, the only conceivable reason I can think of for flying from London to Paris is because the train is too expensive. But if air travellers were forced to pay the true cost of the security theatre, instead of its being funded by the tax-payer, then trains would start to look a lot more attractive.

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See also Jeffrey Goldberg, The Things He Carried (Atlantic, November 2008) via Bruce Schneier

A Bit of a Dump

I may have underestimated the cleverness of BAA, when I criticized the pointless security delays at Heathrow in previous posts. BAA gets a fair proportion of its revenue from retailers in its airports, but obviously passengers aren't going to be shopping while they are stuck in a queue. So the clever trick is to delay the air crew, which delays the flights, leaving the passengers with nothing better to do than shop. Aircrew go through a separate security check, which is always understaffed, and can easily take an hour or more.

On a BBC radio programme broadcast this evening, an American Airlines executive complained bitterly about the failures at Heathrow, which he described as "a bit of a dump". [BBC File On Four, 29 April 2008] EasyJet doesn't operate out of Heathrow, so an EasyJet manager complained about Gatwick instead.

BAA of course points the blame elsewhere: it's the regulators, it's the lack of capacity, it's the job market, you've got to remember that Heathrow is more complex than other airports. As I explained in my previous post Regulated Asset Base, BAA makes more money from building new assets than by operating the existing assets cost-effectively. Indeed, this means it has a real incentive to run Heathrow and Gatwick badly, if this has the effect of persuading planners that more capacity is needed. Clever.

Regulated Asset Base

I'm so worried about what's happenin' today, in the middle east, you know
And I'm worried about the baggage retrieval system they've got at Heathrow
(Monty Python)

Many people think the letters "BAA" stand for "British Airports Authority", but this hasn't been true for a long time. The company owns three London airports (Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted) and four Scottish ones, and therefore controls a large slice of UK civilian aviation, but it was sold off by the Conservative Government in 1986 and is now owned by Spanish firm Grupo Ferrovial.

BAA gains its revenues from landing fees charged to airlines, and from retail operations. Landing fees are regulated to prevent BAA abusing its near-monopoly position: as a result, landing fees at Heathrow are considerably lower than at rival airports in Europe (Paris Charles de Gaulle, Amsterdam Schiphol, Frankfurt). BAA has to make up the difference through retail.

So is that the purpose of Terminal Five - more shops, more delays, more pointless duty-free purchases? Not entirely.

BAA is regulated according to a formula that depends on its asset base - so-called RAB. As Michael Ryan (boss of RyanAir) complains to anyone who will listen, this means BAA can make higher profits from investing in white elephants new assets than from running the existing assets properly.

Bear that in mind when you hear them talking up Terminal Five in terms of passenger convenience.

Oh, and a third runway at Heathrow? Ha, ha, bloody ha.

Further comment

• Heathrow Terminal Five
• Travel Hopefully

Sources

• Heathrow held back by low landing fees (Daily Telegraph, 7 September 2007)
• Heathrow and Gatwick quinquennial review (Competition Commission, 2007)
• Written evidence by British Airways to the House of Commons Select Committee on Transport (November 2007)

Travel Hopefully

The quaint licensing laws of the United Kingdom used to contain the notion of the "bona fide traveller". At certain times and places (Sundays? Scotland and Wales?) inns were not permitted to serve alcohol to local customers, but could only serve genuine tourists, people who travelled "in good faith".

In some parts of the country, people would go on Sunday coach trips to the next town, where they could drink as travellers. This was certainly against the spirit and letter of the law - they were travelling in order to drink, not travelling "in good faith" - but they usually got away with it.

I remember hearing the great war correspondent James Cameron tell a stirring tale of having battled his way back to Scotland across several continents, perhaps from some remote corner of the Korean or Vietnam War, only to be denied a drink in the pub nearest his home because as a local he didn't count as a "bona fide traveller".

Today, in the photogenic but dysfunctional Terminal Five building at Heathrow Airport, the airport authority hoped to verify travellers' bona fides by taking fingerprints. Are you permitted to buy cheap gin? Are you permitted to get on this charabanc to Rhyl, with or without baggage?

Biometrics and identity cards can maybe tell the authorities who you are and where you live, but they are not enough to reveal your intentions, your bona fides. Did you pack this bag yourself? Has a mysterious stranger given you anything to carry? Are you conspiring to overthrow, put down, or to destroy any government by force? (tick YES or NO)

BAA claims that fingerprints are required to prevent terrorists from stealing into the UK, but of course what they really mean is "known" terrorists - people whose names and fingerprints are already on the blacklist, or people who are already "wanted" in other countries. Maybe we need some more technology - perhaps lie detectors, or the "tunnel of truth".

Meanwhile, there are suspicions in some quarters that the physical layout and passenger processing are principally designed not to promote the security of the country and its transport operations, but to promote the commercial profitability of the airport and its retail operations. Fingerprints overruled by the Information Commissioner, they are going to take photographs instead. Oh well, so that's all right then. Rhyl, here I come.

See also: Heathrow Terminal Five, Actually You Can't Fly Either

Shoes and the Devil

When Bruce Schneier passes through Heathrow, he skips the security queues by going through the fast track lane. So he has nothing much to lose by revealing a vulnerability in the arrangements for checking shoes safety - Defeating the Shoe Scanning Machine at Heathrow.

But many of his readers travel in economy class. They are hoping that the authorities do not make the shoe-testing more onerous than it already is.

Before publishing vulnerabilities, one need to judge the likely outcomes. Perhaps some people think it would be a good thing if air travellers are subjected to further stupid harassment (and risk of foot infection) at Heathrow, because this would reduce the quantity of pointless tourism and even more pointless business meetings.

But the people who would suffer the worst from a further tightening of shoe-related security would be fashion shoe designers, with carry-on bags stuffed with thousands of pounds worth of glamorous stilettos and supercool trainers. Perhaps Schneier should publish that vulnerability as well, drive shoe design underground, and force fashion victims to wear sensible shoes instead!

There are many strange beliefs and customs associated with shoes, some even stranger than the superstitious security checks currently practised at airports around the world. Not far from Heathrow is St Dunstan's Church in Cranford Park. It was St Dunstan who, according to legend, once nailed a pair of horseshoes to the Devil's feet, and this is thought to explain the use of the horseshoe as a good luck charm.

Modern technology has taken the horseshoe magnet and produced an electromagnetic equivalent. Before we can be permitted to board an aeroplane, our possessions must be purified by contact with magnets, so that we can be sure they are safe of the influence of the devil. (Magnets were first described in an ancient Chinese text called The Book of the Devil Valley Master.)

Makes about as much sense as the normal explanation.

Wikipedia: Horseshoe, St Dunstan
Link: St Dunstan's, Cranford Park

Dangerous Coffee

Airports are divided into two zones - landside and airside - with a security boundary between.

I have generally found that the sandwiches and drinks are cheaper on the landside. (One major UK retailer sells good sandwiches in its landside shops, but not in its airside shops). And in some airports the best coffee is landside.

Makes sense. Once the passengers have gone through security, they are captive. The airport can get an economic "rent" by making them pay more for food and drink while they're waiting for a flight. (Isn't that the real reason they want us to check in so early.)

I hate being ripped off. So I try to buy anything I need on the landside, before going through security. And at some airports, that includes coffee.

Oh, but you can't do that anymore. For security reasons, you now can't take coffee through from landside to airside. Yeah, what do you think I've got concealed in my latte - nail scissors?

Any stupid regulation can be justified by appealing to security. But it doesn't take much to work out who really benefits commercially from these so-called regulations.

See previous post No Fly on Us

Tourism Suppression Agency

Gary Leff (Webflyer) has identifed several alternative purposes for the TSA.

• (T)aking (S)cissors (A)way
• (T)housands (S)tanding (A)round
• (T)ourism (S)uppression (A)gency

He complains that what the TSA does is force people and planes to spend more time on the ground at airports. As Adam Shostack points out, it is Uncle Sam imposing this. [Adam and I have already discussed this - see No Fly on Us]

However, for people who worry about carbon emissions and climate change, people who think that tourism has environmental and social costs as well as benefits, and people who sell replacement scissors, the current behaviour of the TSA may be welcome. It's an ill wind that blows nobody any good.

No Fly On Us

"If you assume the No-Fly List serves an important purpose, the system as it presently operates contains a gaping, dangerous loophole that makes the list nearly useless."

(Andy Bowers, A Dangerous LoopHole. Slate, Feb 7th, 2005)

These so-called security measures have been widely criticized (for example by Bruce Schneier), and it is hard to believe that anyone in authority seriously believes they would actually stop an attack. According to the POSIWID principle, if we want to understand the true purpose of the security checks, we should look at what these checks actually achieve.

• People spend longer in airports and spend more money in the retail outlets. The airport ecosystem becomes more profitable.
• Fast-track procedures for business class travellers encourage more business class travel. Self-service procedures reduce airline costs. The airlines become more profitable.
• People become accustomed to (and therefore more tolerant of) queues and delays. This allows for more flexible utilization of staff, aeroplanes and landing slots by airlines and airports.

See previous posts: Broken Suitcases and Feeble Security.

As Adam Shostak points out, while there are benefits to some players, the overall economic effect is to reduce efficiency. In other words, this is a negative-sum game - the costs to the many outweigh the benefits to the few. But that's a very common pattern of system dysfunction.

It turns out that this vulnerability has been known about for ages. I knew I'd seen a number of similar things in Bruce Schneier's newsletter, but I have now been reminded that Bruce mentioned this exact vulnerability in August 2003. Moreover, Adam Shostak claims to have seen a detailed presentation given to senior TSA managers last February. So what is really going on here? I think this just adds weight to the POSIWID argument.

updated Feb 14th, Feb 16th.

Broken Suitcases

According to Chuang Tzu

To guard yourself against thieves who slash open suitcases, rifle through bags and smash open boxes, one should strap the bags and lock them. The world at large knows that this shows wisdom. However, when a master thief comes, he simply picks up the suitcase, lifts the bag, carries off the box and runs away with them, his only concern being whether the straps and locks will hold! In such an instance, what seemed like wisdom on the part of the owner surely turns out to have been of use only to the master thief!

The post-2001 world is supposed to be characterized by heightened security. In our daily lives (for example when boarding an aeroplane or opening a bank account) we are faced with an array of security measures: causing indignity, inconvenience and delay to many, and possibly intimidating a few minor miscreants. However, the notion that these measures will cause any trouble for organized criminals or terrorists is a sick joke.

The wrong security measures are not just useless - they actually make things easier for the master thief. So whose purpose do they serve?