A complaint has been lodged against Cherie Booth QC by the National Secular Society for giving someone a suspended sentence "because he was a religious person" [BBC News 4 Feb 2010, Independent 4 Feb 2010]
According to most news reports, Shamso Miah (25) was in court for breaking another man's jaw in a fight about queue-jumping in an Essex bank. Is there something particularly British or God-fearing about this crime?
Not to be confused with Shamsu Miah (52) who killed and ate a swan while fasting during Ramadan [The Times, 23 Nov 2006, Sky News, 27 Feb 2008]. The Telegraph has the best headline: Muslim does bird for eating swan. He was jailed for two months because, according to District Judge Andrew Shaw, killing a swan at night with a knife "is a taboo act". The concept of "taboo" comes from Polynesian religion, and in Māori society the concept was often used to protect resources from over-exploitation [Wikipedia: Tapu], but I didn't know it had been incorporated into English law.
(Was it the night-time or the knife that made it taboo? What if he had killed the swan with a coil of rope at midday, say in the billiard room?)
If Cherie Booth allows her judgements to be influenced by a generic category of "religious person", this appears to be consistent with a wishy-washy view of religion that some people have associated with The Tony Blair Faith Foundation. The Catholic Church has been particularly unenthusiastic about the Faith Foundation, and Professor Michel Schooyans of the Catholic University of Louvain has accused Blair and his wife of wishing to reduce all religions "to the same common denominator, which means stripping them of their identity" [Guardian, 13 May 2009].
I wonder where Polynesian religions belong in the Blairs' worldview. Would a noble savage with an ancestor cult be let off lightly in the Booth court? How about a devout cannibal? Or do only certain religions count?
Meanwhile, Booth's decision has prompted some more general questions about religion. On BBC Radio Four, Eddie Mair asks Are religious people more likely to be honest? Is it a coincidence that the Chilcot enquiry has just put Tony Blair's own honesty under the spotlight, while sparing others? [The media's tall tales over Iraq]
Finally, Andrew Brown of the Guardian complains that "everything we know about the case of Shamso Miah seems to come from one agency report of the court case" [Cherie Booth unfair to atheists]. As if this is unusual.
Update: How about the case of Lorraine Mbulawa? 'Possessed' teenager who stabbed her own mother five times is allowed to walk free after judge accepts she 'has strong spiritual beliefs'. (Daily Mail, 24 May 2011)
Update: Here's another curious one. A teenage mugger has been spared a possible seven-year-jail term after telling a crown court judge he found God in prison (Daily Mail 20 Feb 2012). Surely if he had really found God in prison, he would want to return to prison to be closer to God? I wonder what sentence he would have received had he found the Devil in prison?
Showing posts with label crime. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crime. Show all posts
Friday, February 05, 2010
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Hard Cases Make Bad Law
Heated debate in the UK about the new anti-paedophile checks in the UK (Parent driver checks prompt row, BBC News 11 September 2009). On the one side, people suggesting that the new system is a disproportionate response to a single appalling case (Ian Huntley murdering two schoolgirls in Soham); on the other side, people adopting the "no check is excessive if it makes our children safe" line of argument.
It's a big if. Any vetting or screening system will produce false positives and false negatives. Nobody knows how many. There are people cleverer and more devious than Huntley, and they will know more than Huntley did about how the system works, so it is fairly certain that some of them will manage to get through the check undetected. In any case, the check only picks up people who already have a police record. If the check creates a sense of false security, then it potentially makes our children less safe.
Meanwhile, honest volunteers who have been the subject of false allegations in the past may prefer to avoid having these allegations raked over again; so there may be fewer people willing and able to run scout groups, youth clubs, and so on, leaving kids with little option but hanging around on street corners. Nobody knows how many. (Whatever happened to evidence-based policy? Whatever happened to joined-up thinking?)
Furthermore, as one of the detectives responsible for catching Huntley points out (This CRB-check paranoia won’t stop another Soham, The Times, 15 September 2009), the girls knew and trusted Huntley not because he happened to be a caretaker at a completely different school, but because they knew and trusted his girlfriend, Maxine Carr. The logical implication of this is that CRB checks should cover not only classroom assistants (such as Ms Carr) but also their boyfriends. Perhaps the designers of the CRB system already have a cunning plan to extend the scheme later, as soon as its inadequacy becomes apparent.
This seems to be one of those schemes (along with DNA testing and identity cards) where a partial scheme is pushed through as a compromise. The logic of the scheme suggests that it will only work properly if the entire population is covered, and covered far more thoroughly than the present scheme can, but the politicians rightly recognize that this would be politically unacceptable. So they grab what they can get, and wait for a later opportunity to make the scheme yet more totalitarian.
It's a big if. Any vetting or screening system will produce false positives and false negatives. Nobody knows how many. There are people cleverer and more devious than Huntley, and they will know more than Huntley did about how the system works, so it is fairly certain that some of them will manage to get through the check undetected. In any case, the check only picks up people who already have a police record. If the check creates a sense of false security, then it potentially makes our children less safe.
Meanwhile, honest volunteers who have been the subject of false allegations in the past may prefer to avoid having these allegations raked over again; so there may be fewer people willing and able to run scout groups, youth clubs, and so on, leaving kids with little option but hanging around on street corners. Nobody knows how many. (Whatever happened to evidence-based policy? Whatever happened to joined-up thinking?)
Furthermore, as one of the detectives responsible for catching Huntley points out (This CRB-check paranoia won’t stop another Soham, The Times, 15 September 2009), the girls knew and trusted Huntley not because he happened to be a caretaker at a completely different school, but because they knew and trusted his girlfriend, Maxine Carr. The logical implication of this is that CRB checks should cover not only classroom assistants (such as Ms Carr) but also their boyfriends. Perhaps the designers of the CRB system already have a cunning plan to extend the scheme later, as soon as its inadequacy becomes apparent.
This seems to be one of those schemes (along with DNA testing and identity cards) where a partial scheme is pushed through as a compromise. The logic of the scheme suggests that it will only work properly if the entire population is covered, and covered far more thoroughly than the present scheme can, but the politicians rightly recognize that this would be politically unacceptable. So they grab what they can get, and wait for a later opportunity to make the scheme yet more totalitarian.
Friday, February 29, 2008
DNA and Crime 2
In a police state, anything that makes the police more effective is a Good Thing.
We are being bombarded with various measures (actual and proposed) that apparently make the police more effective. Longer detention-without-trial for terrorist suspects. CCTV evidence. And a national DNA database.
Proponents of these measures never fail to slip positive messages into the news media.
On the one hand, here's a terrible crime that was fortuitously solved many years later, *thanks to* the brilliant intervention of DNA scientists. On the other hand, here are some terrible crimes that may never be cleared up, *because* the relevant DNA wasn't recorded.
On the one hand, here is a wicked terrorist whom we were forced to release after a mere 28 days, although we *knew* he was plotting something terrible. On the other hand, here is another wicked terrorist, whom we were able to prosecute *because* the evidence just happened to emerge after a mere 45 days of investigation.
Opponents of these measures sometimes argue that they are ineffective or inaccurate. It is implausible to believe that evidence will suddenly appear after 28 days that was not available before. They say they will only agree to this measure if it can be shown that it sometimes works.
Other opponents argue that they are disproportionate. They do not deny that they may possibly work in a few cases, but claim that the benefits are grossly outweighed by the illiberal side-effects.
The problem with both of these lines of argument is that they are vulnerable to constructed refutation. Detection can be attributed to DNA for crimes that might possibly have been solved by other means. Suspected terrorists can be detained for the maximum permitted period, not just because the investigators are under less pressure to find evidence more quickly, but also because the investigators need to demonstrate that the currently permitted maximum is barely enough. Under certain conditions, the statistics could start to look very favourable, enough to overcome the "disproportionate" argument.
And the supporters of these measures have a further argument up their sleeve - the hypothetical deterrent effect. Imagine how many more crimes might have been perpetrated: would-be criminals who saw the cameras, or remembered the DNA held hostage in the police database, and decided to stay home and watch Big Brother instead. Imagine how many more people might have attempted to smuggle dangerous chemicals or stiletto heels onto aeroplanes, if it had not been for the constant vigilance of dedicated security screeners.
My point is this. Opponents of some specific measure may declare that the measure is unacceptable or counter-productive in a civilized society, may declare that the measure could only be accepted if such-and-such facts could be produced. And they may believe that this opposition is fairly solid, because these facts are extremely unlikely.
But what if the advocates of these measures are able to influence the facts? ...
Of course, I am not saying we are in a police state today. I am not even saying that specific measures would turn our country into a police state. All I am saying is that it is possible to see how repeated application of certain lines of argument could result in a police state.
Here's some evidence to support my conjecture:
We are being bombarded with various measures (actual and proposed) that apparently make the police more effective. Longer detention-without-trial for terrorist suspects. CCTV evidence. And a national DNA database.
Proponents of these measures never fail to slip positive messages into the news media.
On the one hand, here's a terrible crime that was fortuitously solved many years later, *thanks to* the brilliant intervention of DNA scientists. On the other hand, here are some terrible crimes that may never be cleared up, *because* the relevant DNA wasn't recorded.
On the one hand, here is a wicked terrorist whom we were forced to release after a mere 28 days, although we *knew* he was plotting something terrible. On the other hand, here is another wicked terrorist, whom we were able to prosecute *because* the evidence just happened to emerge after a mere 45 days of investigation.
Opponents of these measures sometimes argue that they are ineffective or inaccurate. It is implausible to believe that evidence will suddenly appear after 28 days that was not available before. They say they will only agree to this measure if it can be shown that it sometimes works.
Other opponents argue that they are disproportionate. They do not deny that they may possibly work in a few cases, but claim that the benefits are grossly outweighed by the illiberal side-effects.
The problem with both of these lines of argument is that they are vulnerable to constructed refutation. Detection can be attributed to DNA for crimes that might possibly have been solved by other means. Suspected terrorists can be detained for the maximum permitted period, not just because the investigators are under less pressure to find evidence more quickly, but also because the investigators need to demonstrate that the currently permitted maximum is barely enough. Under certain conditions, the statistics could start to look very favourable, enough to overcome the "disproportionate" argument.
And the supporters of these measures have a further argument up their sleeve - the hypothetical deterrent effect. Imagine how many more crimes might have been perpetrated: would-be criminals who saw the cameras, or remembered the DNA held hostage in the police database, and decided to stay home and watch Big Brother instead. Imagine how many more people might have attempted to smuggle dangerous chemicals or stiletto heels onto aeroplanes, if it had not been for the constant vigilance of dedicated security screeners.
My point is this. Opponents of some specific measure may declare that the measure is unacceptable or counter-productive in a civilized society, may declare that the measure could only be accepted if such-and-such facts could be produced. And they may believe that this opposition is fairly solid, because these facts are extremely unlikely.
But what if the advocates of these measures are able to influence the facts? ...
Of course, I am not saying we are in a police state today. I am not even saying that specific measures would turn our country into a police state. All I am saying is that it is possible to see how repeated application of certain lines of argument could result in a police state.
Update
Here's some evidence to support my conjecture:
- "Up against the buffers": Fact and fiction about the existing 28 day pre-charge detention limit (Liberty, 10 June 2008)
- BBC News 10 June 2008 quoting Liberty Director Shami Chakrabarti
Wednesday, February 20, 2008
Disc Error
Last year, Netherlands police sent a CD to police forces around Europe, containing DNA gathered from thousands of crime scenes in the Netherlands.
The British police aren't actually paid to solve Dutch crimes, so they did what anyone would do - shove the CD in a drawer. When they eventually got around to looking at the data, they found a very small number of matches against the UK DNA database.
Opposition policiticians are making a ridiculous fuss about this. David Cameron describes it as a "catastrophic error of judgement", but that's rather unfair. Busy people have to juggle priorities. The police receive and collect huge amounts of data, and it is immensely costly to sift through and interpret it all. So what are they supposed to do, drop everything whenever their Dutch friends pop a CD in the post?
Of course, any scandal associated with mislaid data helps to remind people about privacy and security, and general Government incompetance, but that doesn't exactly seem to be the problem here.
The problem here is the belief that the existence of data establishes an imperative to DO SOMETHING with the data. And DNA data is "scientific", which makes this imperative all the stronger. This is exactly why many people don't like the idea of collecting DNA data in the first place.
Source: DNA disc failings 'catastrophic' (BBC News, Feb 20th 2008)
The British police aren't actually paid to solve Dutch crimes, so they did what anyone would do - shove the CD in a drawer. When they eventually got around to looking at the data, they found a very small number of matches against the UK DNA database.
Opposition policiticians are making a ridiculous fuss about this. David Cameron describes it as a "catastrophic error of judgement", but that's rather unfair. Busy people have to juggle priorities. The police receive and collect huge amounts of data, and it is immensely costly to sift through and interpret it all. So what are they supposed to do, drop everything whenever their Dutch friends pop a CD in the post?
Of course, any scandal associated with mislaid data helps to remind people about privacy and security, and general Government incompetance, but that doesn't exactly seem to be the problem here.
The problem here is the belief that the existence of data establishes an imperative to DO SOMETHING with the data. And DNA data is "scientific", which makes this imperative all the stronger. This is exactly why many people don't like the idea of collecting DNA data in the first place.
Source: DNA disc failings 'catastrophic' (BBC News, Feb 20th 2008)
Thursday, December 13, 2007
Easy Pickings?
Bruce Schneier picks up a story about the police putting warning stickers on vehicles with tempting parcels for the casual thief. [Conyers Police Department warns shoppers to protect valuables in cars, Rockdale Citizen, Friday, December 07, 2007] Bruce thinks the police are just helping the thieves.
In London, the Metropolitan Police put up notices, apparently addressing car thieves, advertising "Free Satnav in this area". Presumably the intended effect is to remind car owners not to leave their satnav in the car.
In contrast, in the city of Leicester, the police have resorted to handing out free cloths, to wipe the satnav marks from the windscreen. [Source: Leicester Police website] This appears to have exactly the same intended effect - to remind car owners about the vulnerability.
Obviously there is a risk that these warnings may sometimes trigger crime rather than help prevent it. But the principle of publishing vulnerabilities is based on the assumption that this information helps law-abiding people to defend themselves from attack more than it helps the attackers. (There are lots of comments in Bruce's blog discussing whether the same principles apply here as to software vulnerabilities.)
Even if these measures resulted in a short-term increase in the levels of crime, they might seem justified if the longer-term effect was to teach car-owners better security habits.
In London, the Metropolitan Police put up notices, apparently addressing car thieves, advertising "Free Satnav in this area". Presumably the intended effect is to remind car owners not to leave their satnav in the car.
In contrast, in the city of Leicester, the police have resorted to handing out free cloths, to wipe the satnav marks from the windscreen. [Source: Leicester Police website] This appears to have exactly the same intended effect - to remind car owners about the vulnerability.
Obviously there is a risk that these warnings may sometimes trigger crime rather than help prevent it. But the principle of publishing vulnerabilities is based on the assumption that this information helps law-abiding people to defend themselves from attack more than it helps the attackers. (There are lots of comments in Bruce's blog discussing whether the same principles apply here as to software vulnerabilities.)
Even if these measures resulted in a short-term increase in the levels of crime, they might seem justified if the longer-term effect was to teach car-owners better security habits.
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
Tuesday, August 07, 2007
Security Theatre
Steve Swain, formerly with the Metropolitan Police and now a consultant with Control Risks, questions the belief that security cameras prevent crime or terrorism.
Swain has also written an article in the latest issue of his company's newsletter challenging the fantasy of technology.
Meanwhile, the City of New York is planning to spend $90m million (annual running costs $8 million) on a network of security cameras, code-named "Ring of Steel". New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly seems unconcerned that there is no positive evidence of any deterrent effect.
Wikipedia: Clancy Wiggum
See also: The ineffectiveness of security cameras
"I don't know of a single incident where CCTV has actually been used to spot, apprehend or detain offenders in the act. ... The presence of CCTV is irrelevant for those who want to sacrifice their lives to carry out a terrorist act." [CNN August 3rd, 2007, via Bruce Schneier]
Swain has also written an article in the latest issue of his company's newsletter challenging the fantasy of technology.
"In today's threat environment, technology for law enforcement agencies is seen as the answer to all our prayers; all seeing, infallible, indefatigable. If only." [Perspective, July 2007, pdf]
Meanwhile, the City of New York is planning to spend $90m million (annual running costs $8 million) on a network of security cameras, code-named "Ring of Steel". New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly seems unconcerned that there is no positive evidence of any deterrent effect.
"We don't know acts that may have been planned that -- because of the surveillance and deterrence systems that are in place -- did not go forward." [CNN August 3rd, 2007]Seems a remarkably thin justification for spending public money. So if security cameras don't actually prevent crime and terrorism, what is their real purpose? Swain suggests two answers: investigation and public reassurance.
"You need to do this piece of theater so that if the terrorists are looking at you, they can see that you've got some measures in place."Oh, right. Chief Wiggum rules okay.
Wikipedia: Clancy Wiggum
See also: The ineffectiveness of security cameras
Saturday, May 05, 2007
Evil uses of DNA
How many evil uses for DNA can we think of?
Especial thanks to Robin Wilton and the anonymous FishNChipPapers blogger.
Update: DNA Evidence can be fabricated (New York Times, 17 August 2009)
- Leave someone else's DNA at the scene of the crime. (Get a Saturday job sweeping up at the hairdresser.) (We are a nation of suspects)
- Get an accomplice to leave your DNA hundreds of miles from the scene of the crime, in support of a false alibi. (Low Copy Number DNA testing)
- If you don't have an identical twin, get yourself a clone. Then nobody will be able to prove which one of you did it. (Two quickies ...)
- Steal someone's DNA and create a clone. Then threaten to commit all sorts of crimes unless they pay protection money.
- Evade privacy protection by analysing the genetic patters of close relatives. (DNA as an abusable biometric)
- If you know the genetic patterns of people who may be especially vulnerable to your evil schemes (the gene for "trust" perhaps), you can search the national DNA database looking for potential victims. (Five civil servants fined over DNA espionage)
- ... any more?
Especial thanks to Robin Wilton and the anonymous FishNChipPapers blogger.
Update: DNA Evidence can be fabricated (New York Times, 17 August 2009)
Wednesday, January 03, 2007
Anonymity
In a comment to my earlier post on Root Cause, Robin Wilton suggested a link between anonymity and bad behaviour.
This proposition appears to justify a high level of surveillance, as a crime-prevention measure. It also appears to justify various forms of "naming-and-shaming". Unfortunately, the proposition is not universally true. There are apparently some people who are not inhibited - and may even be encouraged - by the possibility of being identified.
For example, "a head teacher has spoken of his shock at seeing a video clip posted on a public website of a laughing pupil hurling a rock at a classroom window". [BBC News Jan 3rd 2007 via Into the Machine] And see also "Is there shaming in naming?" [BBC News Magazine via Tomorrow's Fish and Chip Paper, with a comment from me.]
So we have two kinds of identity in competition here. There is an old-fashioned notion of identity-as-respectability, and a Big-Brother notion of identity-as-notoriety. And so if social control mechanisms are designed by and for people with a given mindset, how are they supposed to work on people with an entirely different mindset? On people who find the proposition "Big Brother is Watching You" thrilling rather than chilling?
According to Donella Meadows' 12-point framework for system intervention, changes in mindset or paradigm are among the most powerful modes of system change (leverage point 2). Old fashioned social control (including the measures enthusiastically embraced by the current Government) doesn't seem to have the requisite variety to respond appropriately to these changes.
I am not saying that people are changing their notion of identity solely in order to evade social control - paradigm shifts aren't generally amenable to such rational calculation. But it is interesting that certain changes in the prevailing notion of identity seem to have the effect of weakening or negating certain social control mechanisms. And it is conceivable that these social control mechanisms have the effect of reinforcing certain social trends, including a paradigm-shift in notions of identity.
See my earlier post on Big Brother. And see Scribe's post on The Polarizing Effect of Surveillance.
"If all potential criminals were identifiable all the time, they would be inhibited from committing crimes ... [and therefore] if no-one has any anonymity, everyone will be law-abiding."
This proposition appears to justify a high level of surveillance, as a crime-prevention measure. It also appears to justify various forms of "naming-and-shaming". Unfortunately, the proposition is not universally true. There are apparently some people who are not inhibited - and may even be encouraged - by the possibility of being identified.
For example, "a head teacher has spoken of his shock at seeing a video clip posted on a public website of a laughing pupil hurling a rock at a classroom window". [BBC News Jan 3rd 2007 via Into the Machine] And see also "Is there shaming in naming?" [BBC News Magazine via Tomorrow's Fish and Chip Paper, with a comment from me.]
So we have two kinds of identity in competition here. There is an old-fashioned notion of identity-as-respectability, and a Big-Brother notion of identity-as-notoriety. And so if social control mechanisms are designed by and for people with a given mindset, how are they supposed to work on people with an entirely different mindset? On people who find the proposition "Big Brother is Watching You" thrilling rather than chilling?
According to Donella Meadows' 12-point framework for system intervention, changes in mindset or paradigm are among the most powerful modes of system change (leverage point 2). Old fashioned social control (including the measures enthusiastically embraced by the current Government) doesn't seem to have the requisite variety to respond appropriately to these changes.
I am not saying that people are changing their notion of identity solely in order to evade social control - paradigm shifts aren't generally amenable to such rational calculation. But it is interesting that certain changes in the prevailing notion of identity seem to have the effect of weakening or negating certain social control mechanisms. And it is conceivable that these social control mechanisms have the effect of reinforcing certain social trends, including a paradigm-shift in notions of identity.
See my earlier post on Big Brother. And see Scribe's post on The Polarizing Effect of Surveillance.
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