Showing posts with label DNA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DNA. Show all posts

Friday, November 24, 2023

Data and the Genome

The word data comes from the Latin meaning that which is given. So one might think it is entirely appropriate to use the word for our DNA, given to us by our parents, thanks to millions of years of evolution. DNA is often described as a genetic code; the word code either refers to the way biological information is represented in the molecular structure of chromosomes, or to the way these chromosomes can be understood as a set of instructions for building a biological entity. Watson and Crick used the word code in their 1953 Nature article.

However, when people talk about the human genome, they are often referring to a non-biological representation in some artificial datastore. In other words, given by biology to data science.

Shannon E French objects to talking about data stored on DNA like it’s some kind of memory stick, and Abeba Birhane sees this as part of the current trend that is so determined to present AI as human-like at all costs, describing humans in machinic terms has become normalised.

Elsewhere, Abeba Birhane is known for her strong critique of AI. As well as important ethical issues (algorithmic bias, digital colonialism, accountability, exploitation/expropriation), she has also raised concerns about the false promise of AI hype.

But describing humans (or other biological entities) in machinic terms, or treating them as instruments. is far older than AI. When we replace animals with technical devices (canaries. carrier pigeons, horses), the substitution implies that the animals had been treated as devices, the replacement often justified by the argument that technical devices are cheaper, more efficient, or more reliable, or don't require regular breaks - or are simply more modern. Conversely, when scientists try to repurpose DNA as a data storage mechanism, this also seems to mean treating biology in instrumental terms.

But arguably what is stored or encoded in the DNA - whether in its original biological manifestation or more recent exercises in bioengineering - is still data, regardless of how or for whom it is used.



Abeba Birhane, Atoosa Kasirzadeh, David Leslie and Sandra Wachter, Science in the age of large language models (Nature Reviews Physics, Volume 5, May 2023, 277–280)

Abeba Birhane and Deborah Raji, ChatGPT, Galactica and the Progress Trap (Wired, 9 December 2022)

Grace Browne, AI is steeped in Big Tech's 'Digital Colonialism' (Wired, 25 May 2023)

J.D. Watson and F.H.C. Crick, Genetical Implications of the Structure of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (Nature, 30 May 1953)

Related posts: Naive Epistemology (July 2020), Limitations of Machine Learning (July 2020), Mapping out the entire world of objects (July 2020), Lie Detectors at Airports (April 2022), Algorithmic Intuition (November 2023)

Saturday, March 29, 2008

Political DNA

Liberal Democrat MP Matthew Taylor was adopted as a baby, and has only recently traced his birth family. Imagine his surprise to learn that his great grandfather was also a Liberal MP!

"The fact that I followed my great-grandfather into politics is surprising enough," he says. "But the fact that I chose the same sort of politics is more than just coincidence. The odds in favour of that happening by accident must be minuscule." [BBC News, 28 March 2008]
Matthew seems to be implying that the Liberal party is a particularly unlikely choice, but of course it wasn't so unusual in his great-grandfather's day. Lots of politicians have Liberal MPs in their family tree, including the Benn dynasty. (Two generations of Liberal MPs followed by two generations of Labour MPs - what odds are the bookies taking for Hilary Benn's four children - four different parties perhaps?)

Meanwhile in the United States, a genealogical organization has discovered family relationships between various unlikely characters. Barack Obama is distantly related to George Bush, Dick Cheney, Winston Churchill, Gerald Ford, Lyndon Johnson and Harry S Truman. (And me, obviously.) For her part, Hillary Clinton is distantly related to Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall (but then who isn't?). [BBC News, 26 March 2008]

Update (October 2008): Sarah Palin and Princess Diana are cousins.

The aristocracy has always had good records of this sort of thing, it being important in some circles to trace your family back to the Norman Conquest or the Pilgrim Fathers, but ordinary mortals are catching up thanks to the Internet, which supports a vast grid of amateur genealogists. And DNA testing is producing a few surprises, including two English women descended from Native Americans. [BBC News 4 May 2007]

But do the mathematics. Some of the people who were alive five hundred years ago have no living descendants at all (thanks Darwin!), while others have millions. So we don't have to go back very far to find common ancestors.

We might also note that an obsession with breeding can produce inbreeding. This helps to explain the congenital ill-health and lack of intellectual prowess in some closely knit groups, including perhaps some branches of European Royalty. And if the latest genealogical research reveals inbreeding among the political classes, that might explain a few things mightn't it?

Friday, February 29, 2008

DNA and Crime 2

In a police state, anything that makes the police more effective is a Good Thing.

We are being bombarded with various measures (actual and proposed) that apparently make the police more effective. Longer detention-without-trial for terrorist suspects. CCTV evidence. And a national DNA database.

Proponents of these measures never fail to slip positive messages into the news media.

On the one hand, here's a terrible crime that was fortuitously solved many years later, *thanks to* the brilliant intervention of DNA scientists. On the other hand, here are some terrible crimes that may never be cleared up, *because* the relevant DNA wasn't recorded.

On the one hand, here is a wicked terrorist whom we were forced to release after a mere 28 days, although we *knew* he was plotting something terrible. On the other hand, here is another wicked terrorist, whom we were able to prosecute *because* the evidence just happened to emerge after a mere 45 days of investigation.

Opponents of these measures sometimes argue that they are ineffective or inaccurate. It is implausible to believe that evidence will suddenly appear after 28 days that was not available before. They say they will only agree to this measure if it can be shown that it sometimes works.

Other opponents argue that they are disproportionate. They do not deny that they may possibly work in a few cases, but claim that the benefits are grossly outweighed by the illiberal side-effects.

The problem with both of these lines of argument is that they are vulnerable to constructed refutation. Detection can be attributed to DNA for crimes that might possibly have been solved by other means. Suspected terrorists can be detained for the maximum permitted period, not just because the investigators are under less pressure to find evidence more quickly, but also because the investigators need to demonstrate that the currently permitted maximum is barely enough. Under certain conditions, the statistics could start to look very favourable, enough to overcome the "disproportionate" argument.

And the supporters of these measures have a further argument up their sleeve - the hypothetical deterrent effect. Imagine how many more crimes might have been perpetrated: would-be criminals who saw the cameras, or remembered the DNA held hostage in the police database, and decided to stay home and watch Big Brother instead. Imagine how many more people might have attempted to smuggle dangerous chemicals or stiletto heels onto aeroplanes, if it had not been for the constant vigilance of dedicated security screeners.

My point is this. Opponents of some specific measure may declare that the measure is unacceptable or counter-productive in a civilized society, may declare that the measure could only be accepted if such-and-such facts could be produced. And they may believe that this opposition is fairly solid, because these facts are extremely unlikely.

But what if the advocates of these measures are able to influence the facts? ...

Of course, I am not saying we are in a police state today. I am not even saying that specific measures would turn our country into a police state. All I am saying is that it is possible to see how repeated application of certain lines of argument could result in a police state.

Update


Here's some evidence to support my conjecture:

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Disc Error

Last year, Netherlands police sent a CD to police forces around Europe, containing DNA gathered from thousands of crime scenes in the Netherlands.

The British police aren't actually paid to solve Dutch crimes, so they did what anyone would do - shove the CD in a drawer. When they eventually got around to looking at the data, they found a very small number of matches against the UK DNA database.

Opposition policiticians are making a ridiculous fuss about this. David Cameron describes it as a "catastrophic error of judgement", but that's rather unfair. Busy people have to juggle priorities. The police receive and collect huge amounts of data, and it is immensely costly to sift through and interpret it all. So what are they supposed to do, drop everything whenever their Dutch friends pop a CD in the post?

Of course, any scandal associated with mislaid data helps to remind people about privacy and security, and general Government incompetance, but that doesn't exactly seem to be the problem here.

The problem here is the belief that the existence of data establishes an imperative to DO SOMETHING with the data. And DNA data is "scientific", which makes this imperative all the stronger. This is exactly why many people don't like the idea of collecting DNA data in the first place.

Source: DNA disc failings 'catastrophic' (BBC News, Feb 20th 2008)

Monday, December 10, 2007

In the Courts

Christmas approaches, and the courts are getting busy.
  • In the western Greek city of Patras, a parrot is facing a $650 (£320; 444 euros) parking ticket. [BBC News]
  • A judge in India has summoned two Hindu gods, Ram and Hanuman, to help resolve a property dispute. [BBC News]
  • And a 57-year-old man who turned up alive five years after being presumed dead in a canoeing accident is due in court in the UK. [BBC News]

By an interesting twist of fate, the 57-year-old man is called John Darwin. He was caught by a woman who typed his name into Google, and found a photo on a "Move to Panama" website [Daily Mirror, December 6th 2007]. This "long-tail" detective (who doesn't wish to be named) has nominated Darwin and his wife for a "World's Dumbest" award.

But he doesn't qualify for a Darwin Award, contenders for which are required to kill or dismember themselves in some spectacularly stupid accident, preferably before passing on their genes, thus helping to remove their stupidity from the gene pool. John Darwin survived the canoeing accident (although some doubt there ever was a canoe), and his relatives (including his sons) are apparently trying to make things worse for him. So the stupidity lives on.

Update

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

DNA and Crime

I blame the parents.

Monday, September 24, 2007

Big Bang DNA

A senior British judge argued earlier this month that a national DNA database should contain everybody or nobody [BBC News, September 5th 2007 - see also Robin Wilton and Scribe].

In a rational world, multiplying the costs and risks of a future project without matching benefits usually reduces the chances of the project's going ahead. But in the absurd world of public sector projects, it takes a lot more than outrageous costs and implausible benefits to kill a project.



One way to kill a project is to argue for its expansion. People may pretend to support your project, may suggest ways of making it even grander and more expensive, but their real agenda is sabotage - trying to make sure the project never happens. By making it large and complex, they hope to make it impossible.

Of course, we cannot always infer deliberate intention. Some people adopt the same tactic in innocent enthusiasm, so excited by the potential of an idea, that they do not realise that they are overloading it. And some people are driven by a perverse interpretation of systems thinking: obsessively trying to avoid the environmental fallacy, they fall into the opposite fallacy, which I call the Fallacy of Escalation.

For an example of project escalation, see Eberhard's classic story "The Warning of the Doorknob", which is frequently reproduced in software engineering circles (for example in this piece by Ed Yourdon). See also my own short essay In Praise of Scope Creep, which has also been widely reproduced.

John P. Eberhard, “We Ought to Know the Difference,” Emerging Methods in Environmental Design and Planning, Gary T. Moore, ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970, pp. 364-365.

See also Alëna Iouguina, Systems Design: Because everything* is systems (Shopify UX, 16 February 2017)

Saturday, May 05, 2007

Evil uses of DNA

How many evil uses for DNA can we think of?

  • Leave someone else's DNA at the scene of the crime. (Get a Saturday job sweeping up at the hairdresser.) (We are a nation of suspects)
  • Get an accomplice to leave your DNA hundreds of miles from the scene of the crime, in support of a false alibi. (Low Copy Number DNA testing)
  • If you don't have an identical twin, get yourself a clone. Then nobody will be able to prove which one of you did it. (Two quickies ...)
  • Steal someone's DNA and create a clone. Then threaten to commit all sorts of crimes unless they pay protection money.
  • If you know the genetic patterns of people who may be especially vulnerable to your evil schemes (the gene for "trust" perhaps), you can search the national DNA database looking for potential victims. (Five civil servants fined over DNA espionage)
  • ... any more?

Especial thanks to Robin Wilton and the anonymous FishNChipPapers blogger.

Update: DNA Evidence can be fabricated (New York Times, 17 August 2009)

Saturday, February 25, 2006

The True Motive for Identity Cards

Many security experts have expressed some doubts whether the UK's proposed ID card scheme will be able to satisfy the security goals that the supporters of the scheme use to justify the absurd (and secretive) levels of cost and risk.

The official goals apparently include the elimination of terrorism, and the elimination of certain forms of bank fraud (misleadingly known as identity theft).

On the POSIWID blog, we have previously expressed some cynicism about these goals. If the ID card scheme is not going to achieve the official goals, then there must be some other (unofficial) goals. Which they can't tell us about, obviously.

So POSIWID thinking often leads us to suspect a hidden agenda.

But there is another interpretation. If the ID card scheme were combined with a number of other measures (including DNA testing), then it might be able to do more. For example, recent research indicates that there is a gene that is linked to religious belief. Perhaps the ID card will reveal (to appropriately authorized policemen, at a distance of no more than 20 metres) whether I possess this gene.

The ID card scheme doesn't itself satisfy the security goals, but it may provide a useful platform for a range of other security measures. These other security measures will then become inevitable, because that's the only way to justify the money that has already been spent.

(Governments are generally unable to practise zero-based budgeting, because there is too much loss of face in admitting that money has been wasted, so they are forced to waste even more money. Sometimes political accountability is counter-productive.)

Is there a cunning plan here?

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